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APPRECIATING FAMOUS GAMES

SHUZO OHIRA 9-DAN



THE ISHI PRESS

In the first book of its kind in English, a leading modern expert analyses ten of the most famous games from Japanese go history of the 17th to 19th century. The book begins with the lifetime masterpiece of the 4th Honinbo Dosaku and concludes with games by the 19th century geniuses Shuwa and Shusaku, whose skill reached a level of perfection unsurpassed in go history. Ohira's commentary on the games does full justice to their brilliance and profundity, yet makes them accessible to players of all levels.

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FAMOUS GAMES**

About the Author

Shuzo Ohira was born in 1930 in Gifu Prefecture in Japan. At the age of 11 he became a pupil of Minoru Kitani and by 1947 had reached shodan. His promotion to 9-dan came in 1963.

His first championship success was in 1952 when he won a tournament for young players. In 1960 he won the fourth Kodansha Tournament, a competition for 5- to 7-dan professionals. From 1966 to 1969 he won the Nihon Kiin Championship four times in a row and won it yet again in 1972. He was the runner-up in the fourth, fifth and seventh Nihon Kiin First Place Championships.

His father, Kenji Ohira, was also a professional 5-dan but has now retired.

The Cover. A wood-block print (about 1840, possibly by Toyokuni), showing the trepidation of a go-player before an opponent of high social position.

**APPRECIATING
FAMOUS GAMES**

by

Shuzo Ohira, 9-dan

translated by
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INTRODUCTION

It had been in my mind for several years to choose some old games of go and to comment on them from the modern point of view, so that players from 9 to 4-kyu in particular could understand them. The opportunity to do this came quite unexpectedly when I was asked to write a Go Super Book.

This is not really a collection of 'famous' games. The epithet is too subjective anyway. Criteria such as no bad moves, an abundance of good moves, thrilling climaxes and so on could be established, but even so views would differ.

I have in fact chosen ten games from before the Meiji era (1868 onwards), although there is no special significance in this date. Of these, the second game, between Honinbo Dochi and Satonoshi, is far from being a classic. Satonoshi was a very weak player and made many bad or dubious moves. However, it is included here because of the skillfulness with which Dochi despatched his opponent. This is one of the two handicap games requested by the editors.

No doubt a better game between Honinbo Genjo and Chitoku than the one given here (game 4) could have been found, and a similar question mark hangs over the game between Honinbo Shusaku and Yuzo (game 9). However, these games have been included because they have their own intrinsic interest. There were many games I wanted to include apart from these ten. The duels between Genjo and Jowa, Jowa and Genan, and Shuwa and Sanchi are full of fascination, and the famous 'red ear' game between Genan and Shusaku, or Intetsu's game against Jowa in which he vomited blood because of his efforts to win, are equally worthy of inclusion.

There are many ways of studying go. Fuseki, tesuji and life and death can all be learnt from books, but studying games is the most direct method of improving your all-round strength. Fuseki and so on are all included in the one game in living form. Studying various aspects of go in isolation may not up your strength at all, but a game with a comprehensive explanation brings these aspects to life and makes them easier to learn. It makes no difference whether the games are old or new, or even amateur or professional.

This is how I would like you to study this book—with a comprehensive attitude. You can treat it as light reading for a train journey because there are only a few moves per diagram. If you have time, however, you should go over the games thoroughly on a board.

February 1973

Shuzo Ohira

Game 1:
DOSAKU'S MASTERPIECE

Played on 19th November 1683 in the Shogun's Palace White: Honinbo Dosaku Black (2 stones): Yasui Shunchi

Honinbo Dosaku (1645–1702) was born in Iwami in the far West of Japan. Originally called Yamazaki, he changed his name, as was the custom, upon becoming fourth head of the senior of the four famous go families: Honinbo, Yasui, Inoue and Hayashi. In 1678 he also became the fourth Meijin, a title awarded in former days to those who reached the rank of 9-dan. He was at least one stone stronger than anyone else and his later appointment as head of the State Go Academy was accordingly unopposed. Known also as the 'Go Saint', Dosaku is acknowledged as the best of the ten players who achieved the accolade of Meijin before it became the title of the modern annual tournament. His major improvements to the old 'Yasui' (or 'Sanchi') style of play, which was based on the low two-space pincer joseki, brought about a rapid rise in the standard of go. It was Dosaku who introduced the three-space pincer joseki.

It is not clear whether *Yasui Shunchi* was the younger brother, son or pupil of Sanchi, the second head of the Yasui family, but it is known that he took part in seven of the annual ceremonial games played in the Shogun's Palace. Of these he won three and lost four. Against Dosaku, as the weaker player, he always had Black but also took a two-stone handicap in every third game, as was the case here.

This game, played when Dosaku was at the peak of his powers, is regarded not only as the best game of Dosaku's life, but also as Shunchi's masterpiece. It is interesting to see how skilfully and lightly Dosaku managed his groups, whereas Shunchi showed his strength in maintaining the advantage of his handicap stones to the very end.




Fig. 1 (1-11)

Fig. 1 Old Fuseki

One of the features of go before the Meiji Restoration of 1868 is that the fuseki was less refined than it is today. In fact modern players would query even Dosaku's fuseki. For example, it is almost a cast-iron rule in go nowadays to strive to play first in an empty corner, but in the past it was by no means rare to see fusekis where empty corners had been completely ignored. We would therefore have some reservations about White 3 and 5 here, but since 5 combines an extension from 3 with a pincer, and since it is a two-stone game anyway, White has some justification for playing like this.

Black can himself pincer at A on move 4 if he wants to avoid White 5. Then, bearing in mind that it is a handicap game, White would probably approach at B. This could cause confusion but at any rate it is a more positive way for Black to play.

Black 6 is clearly in the wrong direction: C is better. Then if White were to play at D, Black's pincer at E would work well with his enclosure in the lower left corner. Apparently, though, the joseki with the pincer at E had not been developed at the time this game was played.

Black 10 is in the old style but is questionable. Nowadays even most amateurs would extend as far as F. However, it would be rash to assume that the level of go at the end of the 17th century was low just because we can criticise the opening moves.





Fig. 2 (11-27)

Fig. 2 Splendid Two-space Extension


White 11 opens up local hostilities but Black's method of answering this invasion is suspect. 1 in *Dia. 1* is better than Black 14. Then it is important to answer White 8 at 9. If White continues at 10, Black 11 and 13 give better shape than Black managed to get in the game. White could also play 10 at 11, which Black would answer with *a*. These are now well-known josekis of course, but once again they weren't known in Shunchi's day.

The result up to 20 is bad for Black. White can expose his weak points with 24 or A.


White 21 and 23 are natural but clever moves. This two-space extension means that White is wisely attaching little importance to his isolated stone in the top left-hand



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

corner and it also forces Black 24, so that White 23 is really sente. If Black had omitted 24, White would have played there. This would not only establish him firmly on the lower side, but would also divide the board up into lots of small fights, which is to White's advantage in a handicap game. The manoeuvre of White 11 to 23 was a favourite of Dosaku's.

Black 26 might have been acceptable in those days but I can't condone it. It is downright bad. Black 1 in *Dia. 2*, playing on a larger scale, is correct and then Black can later aim at *a*. The reason Black 26 has to be high is simply that Black's position overall is already rather low.

White drew blood with his first bullet at 11. Move 27 was his second bullet. Looking at the board as a whole this is the obvious area for White to play if he wants to start a fight, but normally, instead of 27, he would run away with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*. Then by pressing at 5 White could spare himself the complications of the game.





Fig. 3 (27-39)


Fig. 3 Hand-to-hand Combat

White 27 is nevertheless a vigorous move. If Black answers it incorrectly at 1 in *Dia. 4*, he gets trampled on in the corner as White plays the driving tesuji with 4 and 6. Switching move 3 to 1 in *Dia. 5* is no better. Both sides capture two stones but Black easily gets the poor end of the deal.

Black 28 was therefore sensible but 30 was perhaps wide of the mark. Black should quietly connect at 1 in *Dia. 6* and then proceed to stake out a large territory with 7. Black 32 is a similar idea but once Black 30 has been played, after the forced exchange of 33 and 34, White can cut at 35. This is a very big move as it effectively captures Black 30, but presumably Black played 30 because he was




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

attracted by the possibility of pushing at 36 and 38. Indeed, it must have been very hard for Shunchi to choose between this and *Dia. 6*, because of course, after Black 38, a play by White at A would allow Black to make an extremely powerful wall at B. However, White found an excellent counter-measure in 39—a declaration of war! It is because of this move that *Dia. 6* is probably better for Black.



Dia. 6





Fig. 4 (39-57)

Fig. 4 Attack and Defence

With 43 White is trying to settle himself quickly. White 1 in *Dia. 7* instead simply gives Black a perfect moyo (territorial framework) in spite of the good move at 5. Black 14 and 16, of course, would then be necessary moves. If, instead of 14, Black played *a*, White would destroy him with *b*, Black *c*, White *d*, Black *e*, White *f*.


It is far better for White to ignore the small corner and to try to secure life inside Black's larger moyo. Nevertheless, Black is able to snatch away White's base with 46 and 48. Note, however, how he first exchanges 44 for 45, making White's stones heavy and claiming some territory in the corner. This is better than playing 46 straightaway and is also better than the loose move of Black 1 in *Dia. 8*. Here




Dia. 7

White can descend to 2 and easily resist Black's attack. White 4 would be a good answer to 3 because it is a light way of playing. Black 1 in *Dia. 9*, instead of 46, is aggressive but thin. White can play forcing moves such as 2 to 6 and then make a safe base with 8.


Now although Black has been able to destroy White's base with 46 and 48, it doesn't mean that the two stones 39 and 47 are dead, but White skilfully leaves them to provide some potential and switches play to the other side with 49 and 51. It must be said that tactically the go players of yesteryear were every bit as good as their modern-day counterparts. White interposes forcing moves at 53 and 55 (of course Black can't let White connect at 56) before piling into the corner at 57. It is interesting to see what Shunchi did about this powerful invasion.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9




69, 66 take ko 68 fills ko
Fig. 5 (57-69)


Fig. 5 Furikawari

Black 58 is a strong answer to White's invasion and cannot be criticised. Black 1 in *Dia. 10* instead would be a huge mistake. After 14 there is no way of avoiding a serious ko, which is out of the question for this kind of position.


What about 1 in *Dia. 11*? If White cuts at 2 and Black connects at *a*, we revert to *Dia. 10*, but Black would instead answer at 3 and 5 to capture White. Consequently White would choose 2 and 4 in *Dia. 12* and then he could make good shape with 6. White then has half an eye at *a* and this could be decisive in the later fighting, so this is bad for Black.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Black therefore opted for 58. If White replies with connection at 60, the sequence of *Dia. 12* would then follow but now White wouldn't have his half-eye (i.e. in *Dia. 12* he would have needlessly answered *b* with *a*). White must inevitably resist with 59 and 61, which gives rise to a big ko fight.

Black 64 is a good ko threat but so is White 67. If Black answers it he has no more threats of his own, so he has to accept the furikawari (exchange of territories), but the exchange is in White's favour. The top left corner is worth over 40 points, whereas Black has only around 30 points profit in the top right. However, Black has some compensation in that he has also weakened the six white stones clinging like limpets to his wall.

Overall, though, it does seem that the effect of the two handicap stones has almost disappeared and Black is going to have to try extra hard.





Fig. 6 (69-78)


Fig. 6 A Dubious Move

Black 70 has been the subject of controversy over the years. It doesn't seem essential for Black to play here and most people have branded it a dubious move, an assessment I agree with. Dosaku, however, apparently saw nothing wrong with it and since Shunchi was aiming at A, some people regard it as a brilliant move showing very deep reading. I don't think so. There are better and more urgent points in this game.

No, 70 was a strange move. If it were the end of the game, for instance with the position in *Dia. 13*, White 1 would be a good sente play and so Black would try to get 3 in first. In other words, this is a double sente play.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

If White answers at 2 in *Dia. 14* Black can aim at *a*, but no matter how deeply you read there seems to be nothing in it for Black to justify his 70.

Anyway, Dosaku was too shrewd to miss the chance of ignoring *Dia. 14* and giving up the corner with 71. It is possible that Shunchi may have expected this, and that, bearing in mind it was two-stone game, he wanted to simplify matters and take profit up to 78. At any rate opinion is divided over this move.





Fig. 7 (70-85)


Fig. 7 The Main Fight

Black 70 should have been at 1 in *Dia. 15*, thus surrounding a very large area. If we assume White *a* for Black *b*, Black's territory at the top is worth 70 points. White would have about 65 points of territory but overall Black would have the advantage of greater thickness for the rest of the game. Black 70 has made the game very close.

Dosaku showed great vision in playing 71 and 73 in sente so as to be able to switch to the top part of the board. If Black plays 77 instead of 76, White plays A and then he has the choice of living in the corner or connecting at 76. Black 75 instead of 74 would be answered by White 74, Black B, White A, Black C, and then White captures at D, again leaving himself the choice of living in the corner or connecting.



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

Having given up the lower left corner White can turn to 79. Since Dosaku had already given Black a lot of pure profit he had to have something pretty good up his sleeve. And he had—a marvellous sequence of over 30 moves.

White 79 and 81 are his first ace to help him rescue his ailing stones. Watch how the two half-dead stones $\triangle$ are going to be used to their fullest extent.

If, instead of 84, Black plays 1 in *Dia. 16*, White 6 is a strong move and it is out of the question for Black to try to hem White in at *a*. If he does try, White ruins him with *b*. Black 6 in place of 5 meets with White 5, Black *c*, White *d* and White can build up thickness facing the centre.

Before sacrificing $\triangle$, White adds two stones to them to be sure of the atari at 85.





Fig. 8 (85-101)


Fig. 8. Exquisite Play

Black connected at 86, but what about 1 and 3 in *Dia. 17*? The moves up to 7 are inevitable and then White 8 is very good. Black 9 seems forced and then after 22 there is a semeai that Black can never win so long as White can play *a* in sente to threaten to live or get a ko. If Black ends up by being captured after 1 and 3, he will have no prospects of winning.

Dia. 18 Black 1 and 3 lose even more quickly than *Dia. 17*. White 4 and 6 produce a ko at once and then, after the cut at *a*, White can fight the ko by making eye shape with *b*. And he has a plentiful supply of ko threats elsewhere: for instance *c*, *d* and *e*. Note in this sequence that if White plays *c* before 4, Black must not answer with *f*, because White



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

g makes *e* and the capture of four black stones excellent alternatives for White. Instead Black must answer White *c* with *d*.

For all the above reasons Black 86 is forced. Now Dosaku reveals the second ace up his sleeve—White 87.

If Black tries to cut off the white group with A, White answers at B and it is then easy for him to extricate himself. Alternatively White could press at 88 to build up a big moyo on the lower right side. Black 88 stops this but still casts eyes on the whole of the white group.

White 89 and 91 are forcing moves and then White skillfully manages to get the big point of 93. White 93 at 95 is bad shape and anyway Black D doesn't work since White can connect at 94 or C.

White 97 in response to 94 and 96 is a tesuji.





Fig. 9 (101-119)

Fig. 9 Connection Above and Below

Shunchi tried hard to catch the big white group. Black 2 is a severe attack but 3 is a tesuji and White 5 forces 6. There is nothing to criticise about the entire sequence from White 79 in Fig. 7 by which White extricated his group. Equally, though, Black has done his best and no dubious moves can be credited against him in this case.

Black 8 is a sharp, strong move. Shunchi probably had it in mind from about Black 94. If, instead of 11, White plays A or 1 in *Dia. 19* he leaves himself thin in the centre (Black's capture at 2 is sente). Black can then play *a* immediately or perhaps keep it as a threat and play 4. White 11 and 13 are therefore forced but B is a big move to leave behind and signals success for Black.



Dia. 19

A play at B will have to wait until the endgame stage but if Black gets it, it will probably win him the game. In a sense Black 8 could be called the decisive move.

Black 14 is a good, thick play aiming at the forcing move C. Although he has allowed White to connect, Black has kept thickness over the board as a whole and therefore has better prospects.

White 15 is what I would play but an alternative was E, preventing the invasion at D. However, this would be answered by Black F and Dosaku no doubt felt that the influence this gives Black would leave him with no chance of winning.

With 14 and 16 Black is mapping out a lot of territory in the centre and limiting White's on the lower side. This looks good but White 17 and 19 are very clever moves. White probably chose 15 instead of E just because he had these in mind. I think Dosaku was right in his assessment of the situation; if White had played E instead of 15 he would have fallen too far behind.





Fig. 10 (119-121)

Fig. 10 Concurrent Aims


It seems White has no way of defending against Black 20. No doubt Shunchi felt he had won once he was able to play this and Dosaku must have known he was behind.

White cannot capture 20. 21 seems inevitable but 1 in *Dia. 20* would provide stern resistance. The continuation up to 8 is logical and then White has to play 9 and 11 if he is to capture Black. Black 12 forces 13, and 14 and 20 are tesujis. White 27 is a calm move and the ko resulting after 34 is unfavourable to Black. This is despite the fact that if Black wins the ko he will destroy White's territory. The point is, Black 40 is necessary (otherwise there is an oi-otoshi after White *a*), and after 45 White has four ko threats here.

Black's fatal flaw is shortage of liberties and in the end




⑦ connects ③⑧, ④①, ④④ take ko
Dia. 20




⑩ cuts at the
right of ④
Dia. 21

White will win the ko. Even though the fight is taking place inside White's territory, Black cannot tolerate losing such a large group.


Black 14 and so on in this diagram are premature in fact, but Black does have a way to make two eyes. Note first, however, that Black would appreciate it if White played 1 in *Dia. 21* instead of 21 in *Dia. 20*. Black 2 and 4 are well-known tesujis leading to White's capture by a play "under the stones" at 10.




⑦ connects
Dia. 22



Dia. 23



Dia. 24



Dia. 25


Dia. 22 Black 2 to 13 are the same as in *Dia. 20* but now simply Black 14 and 16 are better. After White 17 to Black 22, *a* and White 33 are empty liberties, so that in the ko resulting after White 24, Black 23, White *b*, Black 25, Black has no need to interpolate the extra move at *c*. Instead he can atari at 29 and win the ko easily. Consequently White has to play 23 and 25 and finally run away at 29 and 31. After Black 32 and the sequence up to the ko of 40, Black no longer is in any danger of being captured. He has plenty of ko threats.

Dia. 23 If White defends at 1 here instead of 17 in *Dia. 22*, Black has 2 etc. and then the decisive and skilful play at 10. If White 9 is at *a*, then Black *b*, White 11, Black 10 captures White's three stones.

Dia. 24 Black 2 is a good reply to this White 1, which is instead of 19 in *Dia. 22*. If White takes away one eye at 3, Black plays 4 and 6. White then has to defend at 7, otherwise Black can live by cutting there. Even so, Black can cut at 8 and start a favourable ko with 10. Of course if 3 is at *a*, Black cuts at 7.

Dia. 25 If White 1, Black answers with 2 and 4. Since the sequence up to 9 is forced, Black can play 10. Then after 11 White ends up being captured by Black 18. White 12 in place of 11 reverts to the ko sequence in *Dia. 22*.

To summarise the above, White cannot capture Black 20 in *Fig. 10*.




36, 39 take ko
Fig. 11 (121-143)

Fig. 11 Devastation in Sente


After White 21, Black was able to gouge a big lump out of White's territory on the side in sente. It would have been foolish to play such a sequence if it had ended in gote.

It may be stating the obvious but White 1 in *Dia. 26*, instead of his 25, is no good. Black lives with 2 and 4. White 27 is a tesuji. Its effect is felt after Black 30. If White had simply connected at 29 instead, Black would play 27 and there would be no aji for White here.

After 31 White has the sente endgame sequence of *Dia. 27* but it would be impetuous to play this at once. White must take account of Black's thickness in the centre and must therefore allow himself the possibility of making a ponnuki with White A, Black B, White C, Black D.



Dia. 26




Dia. 27

For Black the ideal feature of coming away from this invasion on the left side with sente is that he can turn to the endgame play left behind at 32. This is the biggest move on the board and is big enough to win the game. It is worth about 15 points. Black had this in mind when he played 8 in *Fig. 9*.

Capturing at 33 and forcing Black 40 is White's privilege. It is best for Black to play the ko threat at 34 first, but White also has a useful threat at 37.

White 41 and 43 build up thickness. Considering the situation in the lower right corner they are logical moves. If, instead of 43, White plays E, he captures the black stone at 34. Black answers at F and then pushing down at 43 is not so profitable for White because it is gote and he has strengthened Black. Playing as in the game, either Black defends at E, which gives White sente, or a gap is left for White to aim at, with for instance White F or G.




54 takes ko (one line above 51)

Fig. 12 (143-169)

Fig. 12 A Hidden Ko

Black did defend at 44 but then White 45 and 47 are sente and the moves up to 55 are a big endgame sequence. White 45 at A would be an exceptionally trivial play. White 49 and 55 are gote but stop Black playing there in sente. A gote play that stops a sente play by the opponent in the endgame is called a gyaku yose and it has roughly twice the value of a double gote play. But this one is even larger than usual because of the ko at 69.

Black could have played 56 almost any time he liked. Black 58 and so on are played in the correct order. The result up to 68 is gote but it ruins White's territory and leaves behind the possibility of capturing three stones. White 69 starts a ko, but note also the aji of Black B, White C, Black D, White E.



73 takes ko (left of 70) 75 fills at 70


80 takes ko one line above 77, 85 takes ko

Fig. 13 (169-201)

Fig. 13 Black Gets the Centre Territory

Black 74 is forced. If Black A, the six black stones are safe (because of the double ko) but Shunchi had to get the centre territory to win and Black 76 in fact makes this territory very large. Of course he had also counted the ko threats available (remember the ko in the corner) and has decided to give up the five stones. White gave away some points with 79, but if he captures at B, Black has plenty of ko threats here, starting with Black 79.

Black 86 was another good move. At this stage both players probably knew Shunchi was going to win by 1 point. Black 90 at 93 is safer but then victory might slip away. Black 90 and 92 were no doubt played in awareness of the tesuji of White 93.




⑨, ⑫, ⑮, ⑳, ㉓ take ko
Fig. 14 (201-233)

Fig. 14 *Safe at Last*

Black 4 is a tesuji. If White plays 5 at 15, Black descends to A.

The ko fight has been a long time in coming and while playing it out both players are really simply playing out the endgame. White 11 and 13 are only worth 3 points as gyaku yose, but 3 points gyaku yose is now big, and by playing in this way White also retains 23 and 31 as ko threats. Black 14 therefore eliminates the dangerous ko that could develop if White played there.

White 17 is the usual way to stop Black 17 from being sente. White 19 and 21 are big gyaku yose. After 23, White is threatening to live with White C, Black 31, White D.



㉔ takes ko (above ㉓), ㉔ takes ko
㉔ takes back ㉔ connects (left of ㉔)
㉔ (2 lines above ㉔) ㉔ connects at ㉔
㉔ takes 1/2-point ko
White wins 1/2-point ko and fills it
Fig. 15 (233-277)

Fig. 15 *Game of a Lifetime*

Black won by 1 point. No further comment is required on this game except to say that it was brilliantly played by Dosaku. Shunchi made one or two loose moves in the fuseki and Black 70 was dubious, but he retained the advantage of his two-stone handicap with a string of good moves. How Dosaku ever managed to get within 1 point is almost beyond comprehension. There is a custom nowadays to call a two-stone game you lose by 1 point your lifetime masterpiece—it comes from this game.


277 moves. Black wins by 1 point.

CHILD PRODIGY

Dosaku had a pupil called Ogawa Doteiki. At 13 Doteiki was already 6-dan and at 15 he became Dosaku's heir to the Honinbo title. Unfortunately he was a sickly lad and died at the early age of 21. Dosaku's grief at losing the apple of his eye was terrible.

Doteiki's skill was almost equal to that of the Meijin and one day he played two games against Dosaku simply taking Black. He won both by 1 point. The figure below shows one of these games. The record that has been handed down to us shows only 142 moves, but it is a treat to see how wonderfully their stones flow around the board.

Black wins by 1 point.



Black : Ogawa Doteiki
White : Honinbo Dosaku

Game 2:

CRUSHING THE WEAKER PLAYER

Played on 1st February 1710 in the house of Lord Matsudaira of Satsuma
White: Honinbo Dochi
Black (3 stones): Yara no Satonoshi

Honinbo Dochi (1690–1727) was born in Edo. Until he became the 5th Honinbo his name was Kamiya. He succeeded to the title at the age of 13, having been a pupil of Honinbo Dosaku in his twilight years. Under the guardianship of Dosetsu, the 4th Inoue, he improved remarkably and in 1721 became Meijin. As Meijin, Dochi had no opponents of comparable strength and there are few games in which he had to exert his powers to the full.

Yara no Satonoshi: In 1682 a Ryukyuan, Peichin Hamahika, had come to Japan and played Dosaku twice on four stones, scoring one win and one loss. 28 years later when the mountain kings of Ryukyu sent tribute to the Shogun in Edo, they despatched a young genius, Satonoshi, who they were confident would show those in the capital that Ryukyuan were not to be trifled with.

The reason the Ryukyuans were so confident in him was that he was apparently stronger than Peichin Hamahika. However, Dochi insisted on giving him three stones. At the time of this game Dochi was 20 and Satonoshi 15.

Fig. 1 *Crushing the Weaker Player*

Some people might quibble about including this game. It is true that Satonoshi was no better than a strong amateur 5-dan of today and he made numerous bad moves. Moreover his style was uncouth and unrefined, although he had a characteristic strength that derived no doubt from being the strongest player in his own islands. However, this game is a classic example of how to play against a strong weaker player.





Fig. 1 (1-11)

It is a three-stone game and Dochi knows nothing about Satonoshi, so we must remember that he will want to look for pointers as to how to handle Black. We see this happening straightaway.

White's kakari 1 is a bold play but Dochi's confidence, notwithstanding his extreme youth, is quite understandable. At that time his guardian, the Meijin Inoue Dosetsu, was still the foremost player in the land but Dochi was at an age when he was improving all the time. Letting Black get first move in the empty corner with 2 gives an opportunity to start a fight with White 3. Black 10 was the first questionable move.

Dia. 1 Black 1 is the strongest and safest play. If White plays 2, Black can take over the attack.



Dia. 1





Fig. 2 (11-26)

Fig. 2 Dilatoriness


The 15-year old genius, although the darling of his country, seems to have been a bit tense, as Black 12 shows. It is a meaningless, dilatory move.

Instead of White 11 I think I would want to challenge Black 10 in the previous figure by trying 1 in *Dia. 2*. If play proceeds up to White 5, White has managed to get safe groups on both sides. However, White 11 in the figure cannot really be faulted. It is different with Black 12. Such a slack move can hardly be called a move at all.


Instead, if he wants to play here, he should press with Black 25, which is the vital point. But even better is *Dia. 3*, to settle himself with 10 points of territory in the corner. This sequence is a commonly accepted one today. Of course Black 7 defends against White *a*.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

The proof that Black 12 is simply an extension to the side and does not hit White's vital point is that it lets White play lightly and give his group on the side good shape. White 13 is a forcing move preparing for the cap at 15. Black 16 takes profit and seems alright but White further settles his position with 17 and 19. While happily manoeuvring around like this, he is trampling on Black in the corner. As for White 21 instead of 19, Black would play hane at 19 and then White couldn't make good shape.

Of course, Black couldn't cut at 1 in *Dia. 4*. If he does, after White 8 Black's two stones on the right are left fatally exposed.

After 23, which expects Black 24, White turns back to 25 and it seems that Dochi has found out all he needs to know about Satonoshi's go. Black 26 was also dubious. Already the three-stone handicap has become in effect almost two stones.





Fig. 3 (26-43)


Fig. 3 Capturing Useless Stones

No doubt Black was worried about getting two eyes for his big group, but the sequence up to White 31, by which he is hemmed in, is too passive. The two white stones taken with Black 28 and 30 are completely worthless. Black should think instead of not letting White connect at 27 rather than aim at cutting at 28. Instead of Black 26 the quiet 1 in *Dia. 5* is the right way. If White plays elsewhere, Black cuts at 3 and if White, not willing to sacrifice his two stones $\triangle$, plays 4, Black can cut at 5 to set the single white stone adrift. The difference between this and White pressing at 31 is very big. If White answers Black 1 with *a*, Black jumps to *b* and easily gets out into open ground.

Even though Black captures the two white stones, he is not necessarily sure of life, and he has to proceed with the



② elsewhere
Dia. 5



⑨ connects
Dia. 6

sequence from Black 32. Of course he can live by adding one more stone in the corner but that would be unthinkable. Nevertheless we must not overlook the fact that Black 32 to 38, although getting Black's head out into the centre, also strengthen White.

Black 40 is a natural move to restrict the influence White has obtained up to 37. For Black to come out at A would be reckless.

Now White 41 and 43 see the second opportunity to start a fight. Even modern players would play this way and, indeed, it is a severe attack. Black 42 is natural, coming out strongly into the centre.

Dia. 6 If Black plays from below, it is quiet but guileless. The subsequent moves are inevitable but by the time White plays at 10 Black's four stones have been captured, so this is out of the question.





Fig. 4 (43-65)

Fig. 4 The Fighting Spreads


Both sides have groups without bases and so rush out into the centre, trying to cut each other off. In the process White is picking up points with every move and Black's future prospects look rather dim.

White must play 49. This point is concerned with the bases of both players' groups and it cannot be ignored.


Naturally White 47 and 51 affect the black stones in the top right corner, which become rather precarious, but Black had already prepared his answer to White 53. Black 54 was a good move. He gets two eyes with this. If White persists in trying to capture him, White 1 up to Black 8 in *Dia. 7* is the usual way to play, but life is easy for Black because of the aji at *a*.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Dia. 8 If White grabs the single stone with 1, Black 2 and 4 are strong moves, starting a ko. At first sight this might seem alarming but there are numerous internal ko threats and there is actually nothing to worry about at the moment. Since White would lose a lot too were he to lose the ko, he can't even try it yet. Therefore White returns to the lower side again with 55.

Dia. 9 Black 1 instead of Black 56 is quite unreasonable. White 6 is a real body blow to Black. Once Black 56 is played it is White who has to worry about two eyes, and so he plays 57. Black 58 next seems powerful but White gets his base with 59.

Black 60 can clearly be seen to be a bad move if you consider Black's moyo. He has no reason to rescue his three stones and the right move was to bend round at Black 65 to build up thickness. To capture at A would leave bad aji for White and therefore he would be reluctant to play it. White 59 was not meant to aim at capturing the three stones with A—it was to make eye shape. Black 62 and 64 were consistent with what he was aiming at with 60, but the direction of play is wrong—there was no reason not to play Black 65.





Fig. 5 (65-87)

Fig. 5 Failure to Make the Decisive Cut


We have said that Black 62 and 64 in the previous figure were consistent but when Black got to 68 he chickened out.

Dia. 10 The cut at 1 is essential. White 4 is a good move but Black 5 is a forcing move and Black 7 is also strong. White 8 is aiming at the cut at 9 but Black connects as usual at 9 and White can do no more than barely live here in got up to White 18. Consequently the cut at Black 1 and 3 would be very big. White 10 at 13 would leave White in ruins after Black 12.

Dia. 11 Black's retreat at 5 in answer to White 4 allows White to connect at 6 and this is not so good for Black, even though he gets thickness up to 11.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Anyway, returning to Black 68, White makes good shape with 69, which is highly unsatisfactory for Black. Moreover the ko in the top right-hand corner is beginning to prove a nuisance and Black 70 is unfortunately necessary for life.

Black 72: the right move was one point higher at A. White 77 is too good to allow.

White 73 and 75 are good moves, aiming later at B. White 77 challenges Black 72 and casts eyes on the big group in the centre. Such a perfect move should never have been allowed. Black 78, too, should simply be at 80. It just makes White thicker with 79 and 81. After White 83 and 85, 87 was of course directed towards Black's big group.




Fig. 6 (87-101)

Fig. 6 Overall Thinness

Black's position looks stagnant compared to the dynamic arrangement of white's stones. White 89 is a quick forcing move before jumping to 91, but there was nothing wrong with the quiet shimari at 90 by Black. If he impetuously pincers at Black 94 etc., White will play 95 or 99 to get good shape.

White 93, in answer to Black 92, was a good move, claiming some territory and giving himself more elbow room. If he omits it in order to make two eyes in the centre, Black might play the two-space extension to A to take the last big point for himself.

Black's atari at 96 is to prevent White from hemming him in at B, and after the Black 98-White 99 exchange Black 100 starts an attack on the lone white stone 89. However, it cannot be denied that Black's positions are rather too thin to expect much success from this.





Fig. 7 (101-119)

Fig. 7 Last Chance

Black missed a good opportunity with 2. If he had played 1 in *Dia. 12*, he could still win. If White 2, 4 and 6, the big group in the centre would be cut off but Black's kosumi at *a* is very severe and ruins White's attack. Black 2 was a big mistake.

The order in which Dochi played White 3 to 13 is amazingly precise. If Black 4 is at A, White plays 7 and gets the better half of the deal.



Dia. 12





Fig. 8 (119-141)

Fig. 8 *Satonoshi Confused*

White turns to 19 and his victory is now clear. If Black had been able to press at 19 he could still have won, but he lost all hope through his slack move 2 in the last figure.

So he has no choice but to fight with 20 and 22. With Black 30 he manages to hem in White's six stones but he has lots of cutting points and he may not be able to capture them.

White 35 is aiming at a ladder and so is a forcing move. White naturally runs away at 37. Simply White 39 instead of 37, letting Black capture at 37, leaves absolutely no aji. White 39 is yet another forcing move and Black 40, while unpleasant, is essential.



Dia. 13

Dia. 13 Black 1, stressing the attack on White's seven stones, wins the semeai on the left but White has a good reply, namely, White 4 after the atari at 2, which hits the pivotal point of Black's stones. Since White's seven stones have five liberties, White can fill liberties with 6 and 8. Black 9 and 13 take two stones but then White has an oitoshi with 14 and 16. Even if Black comes out at *a*, White chases with *b*, so this doesn't work. Consequently Black 40 was inevitable, letting White make nearly 20 points of territory here with 41. On reflection, though, what if Black 26 had been at A instead? If we assume White 27 and then the same sequence as in the figure, then Black 40, White B, Black 41, White C would produce a real ding-dong fight.

Now after White 41, the left side, which Black thought was his sphere of influence, has become White territory, and about 20 points of it at that. It seems that Black had no idea what was going on, but really this was all inevitable once White had pushed out at 19.

From now on, with defeat staring him in the face, Black's play gets worse and worse as, lemming-like, he rushes towards his fate.





Fig. 9 (141-159)

Fig 9 Big group in Danger

Black 42 and 44 are tesujis but Black 48 was clearly bad shape. However, Satonoshi has correctly judged that it will not be sufficient for him just to capture the two white stones.


Dia. 14 If instead of Black 46 Black plays tightly at 1, it would guarantee him a few points but because of the placement at 2, White 8 to 12 are all good sente plays and when White turns to 14 Black has clearly lost. White 14 is the biggest play on the board, being a 6-point gyaku yose, but the hane and connection White *a*, Black *b*, White *c* would also be possible. With Black 48 Satonoshi was perhaps hoping to get in a sly punch.

After pushing through at 49 White can atari at 51 and Black cannot play 1 in *Dia. 15*. White would answer Black's



Dia. 14

atari 3 at 4. Even if Black then takes the three stones, White cuts at 10 and lays waste to the corner. Therefore Black has not really gained anything from the inevitable sequence up to White 55, but if you look carefully you will see that the big black group extending from the right to the centre and then upwards is still not properly alive. Black invades at 56, trying to live while devastating White's area, but Dochi is not likely to be caught by such a cheeky move.



⑨ takes three stones
Dia. 15




Fig. 10 (159-179)

Fig. 10 *At Death's Door*

White's placement 59 is not intended as an attempt to capture the corner. Rather it is preparation for attacking the big black group. Black found the best reply in 60 but after White 65, White 73 is a good play to have in sente.

White 67 and 69 are clearly designed to capture the black group. If White omits these two moves, Black can play 69, threatening A.

White 75 is the vital point and with this the black group is dead, as both players clearly knew. In Fig. 11 Black is simply thrashing about before giving up the struggle after White 93.




Fig. 11 (179-193)

Second International Match

This game was the second official international match in go history. It is said that in 1610 a Korean, Lee Yak See, came to Japan and played on three stones with the first Honinbo, Sansa. If this is true the game here is the third international match, but there is no record of the game between Sansa and Lee.

Anyway, this game is the perfect example of how White should play a low-handicap game. There can be no question about the skill of Dochi, who skilfully bore the brunt of Black's attack and countered by exploiting his bad moves.


193 moves. Black resigns.

SATONOSHI'S SECOND GAME

After losing to Dochi, Satonoshi wanted to play again. He was allowed to play Aihara Kaseki of the Honinbo family (then 13 years old). Kaseki won as expected, by 2 points.

Aihara Kaseki served as a clerk to the Honinbos and in later life he taught Chihaku, Shuhaku and Hakugen, the 6th, 7th and 8th Honinbos.

295 moves. White wins by 2 points.



Black: Yara no Satonoshi

White: Aihara Kaseki

- 49 connects (44), 69 connects (82), 112 takes ko (90),
 88 takes ko, 141 connect 2 stones, 146 takes ko (136)
 51, 151, 152, 160, 163, 166, 169, 172, 175 take ko
 177 fills ko, 189 connects (178), 201 connects 2 stones (188),
 205 connects (248)

Game 3: THE SEEDS OF MODERN GO

Played on 17th November 1792 in the Shogun's Palace

White: Yasui Senchi Senkaku

Black: Honinbo Retsugen

Retsugen (1750-1808) was the 10th Honinbo. His real name was Yamamoto until he was adopted by his teacher, the 9th Honinbo, Meijin Satsugen. He and Senkaku were the two pillars that supported the go world of the late 18th century, and in fact they became 8-dan together.

Yasui Senchi Senkaku (1764-1837) was born in Musashi, the son of Sakaguchi Sentoku. At first he was called Senchi but he became a pupil of the 6th Yasui, Sentetsu, and upon succeeding him as the 7th head of the Yasui family added Senkaku to his name. Confusingly the 4th and 5th Yasuis were also called Senkaku but since there is another Senchi in this book, we will stick with the name Senkaku. His skill was outstanding and in the ceremonial games played every November in front of the Shogun (the so-called 'castle games'), he scored 18 wins, 9 losses and 2 draws. His style was to emphasise the centre and he had a great influence on the development of the new fuseki style of the 1920's and 30's. Honinbo Shuwa was later to say, "The 7th Yasui, Senkaku, has surely no equal in the development of the present high level of go."

Senkaku is sometimes referred to as the Great Senchi, to distinguish him from his illustrious pupil, Nakano Chitoku, who took the name Senchi upon becoming the 8th Yasui. Retsugen, too, had an illustrious pupil, the 11th Honinbo, Genjo. Apart from their other achievements, therefore, Senkaku and Retsugen thus built the foundations for the golden age that was to follow and last throughout the first half of the 19th century.

Fig. 1 *Three-space Pincer*

With the passage of time only two games with Senkaku as White have survived. This is one of them.

Black 7 and 9 are a natural way of attacking the white stone when White plays elsewhere in the three-space pincer joseki. The variations of this joseki had been thoroughly






Fig. 1 (1-11)



Dia. 1

investigated by the time of this game, but Black 11 was not a good choice as an answer to White 10. It is too low, and in this case Black 1 in *Dia. 1* seems better. White 2 to Black 5 are straightforward and now Black 1 has far more bearing on the centre than Black *a*, because he can aim at *b* as a follow-up to his attack, and all his stones would be in good shape. White 4 cannot be at *c* as that would only lead to a strengthening of Black's position.

Dia. 2 After Black 1 this 3 is another possibility. Play proceeds naturally up to Black 23 but, actually, White's replies are poor and can easily be improved on.



Dia. 2





Fig. 2 (11-16)

Fig. 2 The Modern Approach

If Black plays the variation with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*, White can instead set up a squeeze sequence with 12 and 14. The result is as intolerable for Black as *Dia. 2* was for White.


The strongest reply of all, though, for Black on move 11 is Black 1 in *Dia. 4*. White 4 and 6 are a diversionary tactic to attack the black stones on the right, but Black 11 is a thick move. Although White, too, gets thickness by hemming Black in at 14, Black gets the excellent corner enclosure 15. If White 8 is replaced by 10, Black will cut at 8 and still get a thick position.

But back to the game. Since White has achieved thickness with his 12 and 14, it is natural for Black to protect against the cut at A. However, it would also be possible to grab the corner enclosure of Black 1 in *Dia. 5* and plan to respond




19 connects
Dia. 3

to a cut at A lightly, that is with White 2 here. In other words Black would submit by falling back with 3 (instead of 4). White 6 and 8 are good shape but White is falling behind in tempo, because now Black can occupy yet another corner with 9. This way of thinking is the modern approach, but the question of whether it is right or wrong is quite another matter.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5





Fig. 3 (16-22)

Fig. 3 Naked Aggression


Black 17 was a perfect pincer against White 16 but White ignored it and declared his aggressive intentions by hurling himself straight at Black with White 18. This is my kind of move.

Dia. 6 If White wants to play in the top left-hand corner immediately, he will probably extend along the top with 1 and 3. The important thing is to treat  lightly.


Dia. 7 This White 1 is also conceivable. It expects Black 2 and is high so that White can switch to 3. Nevertheless, Black's pincer at 8 is hard on White and the simple sequence of *Dia. 6* looks much better. Of course, with such a good move as 8 available Black must not replace it with a push at *a* and allow White *b*.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 8 Simply attaching with White 1 is possible too, but, although White controls the corner with 9, the way Black cleanly slices through the white group with 8 is rather disconcerting.

The superiority of White 18 in the game is that it strengthens the exposed bottom right-hand corner. Black 1 in *Dia. 9* instead of Black 19 gives White a large territory on the edge and a comfortable game after he captures at 8.

If Black 19 is at 21, then White plays 19, Black A, White B and Black has been ignominiously pushed around. Black is also wasting his time if he plays 21 at 22. Since he then has to return to the connection at 21 anyway, he might as well make the connection first and thus keep sente.



Dia. 9






Fig. 4 (22-38)

Fig. 4 Profit versus Influence

Black 23 may seem small but it is essential. White has built up strength on the other side with 22, so Black needs a base. He mustn't let White press 'at 23. Moreover, Black 23 takes away the base of the white group and looks forward to attacking it later. White 24 stakes a claim to the right-hand side, and so Black has to do something about it. Nevertheless, Black 25 has been sharply criticised by commentators past and present. But I don't agree with them. It is very difficult to see what else Black can do at this point. Black 1 in *Dia. 10*, for instance, breaks up the side but it lets White secure almost 30 points of territory in the bottom corner with 2, and White is also strengthened in the top corner with 4 and 6. This is a very clumsy way of playing. It is also doubtful whether it would do any good for Black to jump out somewhere around 34 on move 25.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Black 25 to 29 at least secure a base in the corner and make the game close by dividing the board up into lots of small areas. There is nothing wrong in that, and although Black's positions are rather thin, we should note that White hasn't actually got any territory yet.

White 30 and 32 are forcing moves that can be played once White has decided to hem Black in with the good move 34. The position now reflects a perfect contrast between Black's profit and White's outside influence. Black has to do something about the vast expanse of territory that White is claiming on the right-hand side, and Black 35 hits one of the weak points of White's takamoku stone. Black 38 would now be very bad because it is too close to the thickness that White has consolidated with 34, and Black A would be met by White B, as a result of which White's moyo on the right would turn into something very akin to certain territory.

White 38 should surely be at 1 in *Dia. 11*. The result up to White 5 is good shape.

Black had to answer 36 with 37. White 37 would be too big to leave behind in view of Black's thin position.




Fig. 5 (38-50)


Dia. 12

Fig. 5 Senkaku's Style


Attacking from the thick side with White 38 and 40 is typical of Senkaku, but he is being a bit unreasonable. The most natural course to follow was to play White 38 at 42, as in *Dia. 11*.

Black 41 is clever. It makes the white moyo on the right even more over-concentrated than it already is. If White answers with 1 in *Dia. 12*, Black 2 is a forcing move, but rushing for safety with Black 4, 6 and 8 is not good. Not only is his position too low, but Black has a more severe tactic.


Dia. 13 Black's crosscut 2 and 4 is best. If White plays at 5, Black 6 and 8 are a good combination. The sacrifice at Black 18 is a standard technique and the result up to



Dia. 13 15 connects



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Black 24 is a cast-iron wall of thickness. It is just as bad for White to come out at 14 instead of 11.

Dia. 14 If White answers Black's crosscut with 5 and 7, the result after Black 12 is 15 points of secure territory in the corner for Black. In addition, the black stone $\triangle$ still has some effect and the potential of Black *a*, White *b*, Black *c* remains.

For the above reasons White could not answer Black 41 directly. He therefore counterattacked with White 42. If Black responds as in *Dia. 15*, White now presses at 2. White then falls back with 4. After White 8 the stone at $\triangle$ still has nuisance value and it keeps Black 7 in check. If Black 7 is at *a*, White might well connect at *b*.

Consequently Black counterattacked in turn with 43. Then White 44 to 50 were inevitable. Nevertheless, after 50 White's shape looks rather unmanageable and it seems to make things easy for Black.




Fig. 6 (50-65)


Dia. 16

Fig. 6 An Overplay


The fighting spilled over into the corner, where an intricate struggle that was to affect the rest of the game developed.

White A in answer to Black 51, to attack the black groups above and below simultaneously, looks plausible but White chose 52, to which Black's answer of 53 is a tesuji. If White 54 is at 55, Black quite obviously cuts at 54.


Dia. 16 What about this vulgar looking Black 1? White 2 is forced, and then if White answers 5 with 6, Black wins the semeai (race to capture) with 7. However, White could answer Black 3 in a more restrained way with 4 in *Dia. 17*, and then after White 6 the cut at *a* is a severe threat. If Black could settle the situation around here by playing Black *b*, White *c*, Black 6, White *d*, Black *a*, White *e*, it



Dia. 17



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

would defend against White 6 in sente, but it is difficult for Black to find time to play this. Apart from that, removing the potential of this position by playing it out leaves no opportunity to use it in a more constructive way later on, and so this is a loss in itself.

Black 55 expects to capture the cutting stone in accordance with the proverb, but what if White 56 had been a cut on the other side, that is at 1 in *Dia. 18*? Black 6 is a good move and after 10 both his groups are connected and perfectly alive.

Black 61 was very sharp but there was no need to be so aggressive. If Black holds back with 1 in *Dia. 19*, he can easily keep his grip on the game. Nothing could be simpler than his extension to 5. (Incidentally, the white group in the corner cannot be killed as long as White *a* is a forcing move). But this was a game in the presence of the Shogun and honour was at stake. I can't help feeling that with 61 Black was trying to show his fighting spirit.





Fig. 7 (65-80)


Fig. 7 The Battle Lines Spread Out

Although the capture at Black 65 is good shape and is undeniably severe on White, Retsugen must have thought long and hard about it. The reason is that he also had the possibility of hemming White in with a ko after settling the position with Black 1 to 6 in *Dia. 20*. When White cuts at 10 it is a very big ko fight, as a result of which White would trade 12 and 14 for Black 13 and 15. From the purely territorial point of view this exchange favours White, but Black will welcome the huge sphere of influence he gets on the upper side. In spite of this Retsugen rejected the ko, no doubt because White, instead of 12 in *Dia. 20*, might simply connect at 2 in *Dia. 21*. Black has to push at 3 and if play proceeds up to White 12, White *a* remains an awkward threat for Black to have to worry about. This result would certainly not be very good for Black.



Dia. 20 ⑪ takes ko

Even though White can wriggle out at 66, this gives Black the opportunity to defend his own group at the top while attacking with 67. Moreover, Black 75, capturing the single white stone, suddenly leaves the white group in the corner without two eyes. Although it would be a simple matter to lead this group out to the centre to safety, Senkaku realised that playing so passively would give him no chance of winning this game. So, instead, he opened up a second front with White 76 in order to make the game more complicated. If White 76 is at A, Black lives with B and White is left without an attack. Black 77 and 79 are perfectly natural.



Dia. 21





Fig. 8 (80-101)

Fig. 8 A Confused Fight


If Black plays A, the white group in the corner will have no eyes at all, but White has no time to make an extra move to live here. He has to start a fight with 80 and 82. White 82 and 84 work together so that if Black pushes in at B, White can live with C.

If Black 81 is 1 in *Dia. 22*, hoping to capture White with 5 and 7, White can resist with the cut at 8 and get a ko with 12 and 14. After 18 White has two threats, starting with *a*, inside this ko fight and so must win it.

At first sight Black 85 should be at 1 in *Dia. 23*, but White can, in this case, play 8 in sente and turn to 10 to win the race to capture in the corner. Black 85 is therefore inevitable, even though it is not very severe.



Dia. 22



Dia. 23

White 86 expects Black 87, but before answering it White switches to the cut at 88. If Black 91 is at 92, obviously White, wins with 91. Having sorted out the situation on the edge, White can now return to 94. Black has to play 97 to live but this gives White time to push at 98. On the whole White's tactics are succeeding.

Black 99 makes Black A an ominous threat but the group of four black stones that includes 81 is very weak and Black's prospects are not looking too bright.

At the time of this game Senkaku was the best go player in Japan and the results of his games with Retsugen were decidedly in his favour. Taking two stones he scored three wins. Taking Black he scored ten wins and three losses. With White his score was three wins and one draw.

Of all the Yasuis, the 8th, Senchi (or Chitoku) was indisputably the strongest, but Senkaku and the second Yasui, Meijin Sanchi, would be next in line.




Fig. 9 (101-116)


Fig. 9 Fighting on a Wide Front

White 4, cutting through the knight's move, is a tesuji. Simply connecting at White 12 and letting Black play 4 would leave nothing in this position to make use of later.


Black 13 was cunning. If it is at 14 instead, letting White connect at A, it would not be easy to capture the white group on the right. Hence Black 13, and now if White 14 is at 1 in *Dia. 24*, White gets into an awful mess. If White refuses to sacrifice his three stones and connects at 3, Black 6 seals him in completely. With such thickness in the centre Black can be sure of getting either B or C and he must win.

And there is an even better way to play.

Dia. 25 After White 3 Black can cut at 4. Black 10 is a forcing move before Black captures at 12. White 13 is inevitable because of the danger to the large white group



Dia. 24



Dia. 25

in the corner, and then Black 14 guarantees a huge territory covering the left side, the top left-hand corner and the centre. Black wins of course.

White *a*, Black *b*, White *c* will now capture ten black stones, but this is nowhere near as big as the left side. Moreover, if White plays this sequence, Black can clearly live at *d* and Black *e* remains potentially useful for the end-game. Black might also be able to make use of Black *f*, White *g*, Black *h*.

For the above reasons White played 14, forcing Black 15, and rushed to the much sought after 16. If Black captures at D in answer to White 14, White simply ataris at 15.





Fig. 10 (116-136)

Fig. 10 *Lost Chance*

In this figure we shall see how Black overlooked a great chance to win. Black 21 is a good move. Because of Black 19, the white group on the right, resting on a knife edge as it is, could be captured completely by Black A. However, if Black plays at A on move 21, White would still play 22 and the potential size of White's territory in the centre would then be alarmingly large. Black, therefore, limits White's territory first with 21 and clarifies the situation with 23 to 28. This little sequence confirms that White cannot extend his territory into the centre, and now Black could have gone back to A on move 29, that is 1 in *Dia. 26*. He would have had over 50 points of guaranteed territory in the top right-hand corner. White 2 is a forcing move before White completes the capture of the black group with 4, and then,



Dia. 26

when Black defends with 5, the game is as good as over. Black 5 is necessary because White *a* would be a threat against both black groups on the lower edge.

Compared to this, Black 29 in the game was not so good. It may be that Retsugen had planned to play A until he saw the thickness built up by the sequence to 27, and then he changed his mind to attack the white group on the lower side. There is no doubt that Black 33 is a severe move, especially since, after Black 29, Black B is atari and ensures that the white group on the left cannot link up easily to the right. Nevertheless, Black A would have been money in the bank. With 29 and 33, Black still has to earn victory.

Of course, once Black has played these moves he can't change his mind again and go back to A, because now White C remains as a loss.




Fig. 11 (136-148)

Fig. 11 A Regrettable Turn of Events

If Black 37 is at 44, White can seal off the centre with White 37, Black A, White B, and White can also start a ko with White C, Black D, White E, Black F, White 46.

Eight black stones fall into White's hands with 38 and now Black should play D instead of 41. White would play 44 and be virtually safe from capture, but Black I would be a large move to have in store for the endgame. After White 44 and 46 the ko is a heavy burden for Black.

Black 47 must have been an oversight. Even after this, Black 1 to 13 in *Dia. 27* are only endgame moves. I can't believe Retsugen played 47 just to make more ko threats.





Fig. 12 (148-170) 54, 57, 60, 63, 65, 69 take ko


Fig. 12

White 48 turns the tables completely. Because of the two moves Black 41 and 47 the ko at 49 has become one that Black, but not White, has to win. White now loses nothing if he loses the ko; Black loses his group. The ko continues with White 50 and the rest. Compare this with the straightforward path Black could have followed in *Dia. 26*.

Presumably Black didn't play 41 at 50 because he considered White's attack to be insignificant, but judging by the result up to 48 it is a mystery why he should have thought this. He has also brought himself problems in the lower right corner.



Dia. 27




75 takes ko, 77 fills at 72 83 fills at 80
Fig. 13 (170-184) 184 moves. Black resigns.

Fig. 13 Victory

Black finally ignored White's ko threat 70, trying to settle the ko indirectly with 71. Let's see what happens if he answers it, at 1 in *Dia. 28*. Black takes the ko with 5 and White lets him live with 6. Then, after White 8 and 10, Black 11 is necessary to ensure life. White can leave the capture of the five black stones for now because 12 is bigger. Black 13 and 15 to 21 are sente moves, so that Black can turn to the capture of three stones with 23. However, White is now a good ten points ahead.

Black 71 could be at A, to take away White's eyes in the corner. Then Black could continue fighting the ko but this time with the prospect of capturing the white group. Nevertheless, he has already ignored one ko threat at 70, so White can hardly lose. Once White pushes through



5 takes ko 7 fills
Dia. 28

at 74 his victory is certain. Black wins the ko with 77 and lives but the white group can live too, either by cutting at B or by adding a stone in the corner.

After White 84 Black has no compensation for White 74, he needs a move at C to live at the top, and his group on the left is in desperate need of help. He has no choice but to resign.

This game started off with White being a little unreasonable in his intentions, but a severe fight soon developed and it spread over the whole board. Right at the last moment Black lost his way and victory slipped from his grasp.


Judging by this game, Senkaku was the stronger player, but in all probability it was one of Retsugen's off days. My teacher, Minoru Kitani, liked this game of Senkaku's. Perhaps, subconsciously, he was influenced by it when he started to experiment with the new fuseki of the 30's in which great emphasis was placed on outside influence. If so, old go is a source of inspiration for the modern game

and this makes our trip back into the past even more worthwhile.

SENKAKU versus GENJO

The figure below shows another 'castle game', this time between Yasui Senchi Senkaku and Honinbo Genjo (Black) in 1803. Senkaku was 40 at the time, Genjo 29. Although Senkaku lost by 1 point, his go style is exciting to watch. The late Kensaku Segoe said that Senkaku was one of our greatest players. There is no doubt about that, and it is unfortunate that he is overshadowed by his own, even greater successor, Chitoku. I enjoy Senkaku's games very much.

253 moves. Black wins by 1 point.



Black : Honinbo Genjo

White : Yasui Senkaku

① takes ko at 79, ①④, ①⑦ take ko, ②③ connects 2 stones,

④⑤ takes ko at ①, ⑥⑦ fills ko at ①⑧

Game 4: ONE MEIJIN TOO MANY

Played on 17th November 1804 in the Shogun's Palace

White: Nakano Chitoku

Black: Honinbo Genjo

Honinbo Genjo (1775-1832), the 11th Honinbo, was born in Edo, his real name being Miyashige. He was promoted to 7-dan in 1804 together with Chitoku. He did not succeed to the headship of the Honinbo family until 1809, after which he and Chitoku were promoted to 8-dan. In 1827 he retired to allow Jowa to assume the Honinbo title.

Nakano Chitoku (1776-1838) was born on an island in Izu. He changed his name to Yasui Senchi in 1814 upon becoming the 8th head of the Yasui family.

There were 77 games between these two. Chitoku had Black in 42 games, of which he won 32. Genjo won 6 and there were two draws, while two games remained unfinished. With White Chitoku won 6, Genjo 27 and 2 games were drawn. Overall Chitoku won 5 more games than Genjo, but he had Black seven times more, so they must have been completely equal in skill. Both, in fact, reached 9-dan strength but since only one person could be Meijin (i.e. 9-dan), out of respect for the other neither player would accept promotion beyond 8-dan.

Genjo's style was to go for thickness and high positions, whereas Chitoku favoured a low, sober style.





Fig. 1 (1-11)

Fig. 1 A Golden Age

The first half of the 19th century was a golden age for go, and the two men most responsible for this were Genjo and Chitoku.

The games of both have made their mark in go history, but this particular game is not really one of Chitoku's most distinguished. And all because he made one slack move.

The high corner enclosure of Black 1 and 3 was fairly common in Genjo's games. He played it whenever he wanted to obtain thickness in the centre. The same feeling is evident in the high approach at 7, although it would be wrong to play low anyway here, at A. White B would be a perfect combination of pincer and extension.



Dia. 1

White 8 and 10 are in the modern style but White 1 in *Dia. 1* is quite plausible. Black 2 and so on lead to a well-known joseki. With 17 White is perhaps in control of the game in this part of the board, but it is not necessarily bad for Black. If White is reluctant to allow Black the exchange of 16 for 17, he could also play at 16 first. This would be followed by Black *a*, White *b*, Black *c* and then White could return to the joseki of White 1 to 15. After that Black would calmly play *d* and sit back to see what White will do. Of course, it rarely happens that the opening proceeds so simply.





Fig. 2 (11-18)

Fig. 2 Joseki Discussion


White 12 somehow smacks of old go. Nobody plays this move nowadays. Instead, White sometimes plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2* but his position is rather thin and I'm not very keen on it.

Dia. 3 White 1 and 3 are strictly part of the modern idiom—Go Seigen style—and there are many variations of this double hane joseki. For example, White 3 could be at 4, or Black 8 at 9. Anyway, if it were a modern game, White would probably play this 1 and 3.

The reason why White 12 is not played nowadays is shown in *Dia. 4*. Instead of the 15 in the game, Black plays 1. Then if White chooses this 6, Black 9 is a sacrifice to make possible the moves up to Black 19. Then, after 21, Black 23 and 29 are good moves to build up strong outside influence.



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


White's territory is worth 24 points. In this game, by the way, if White 24 is played at 25, followed by Black 24 and White 28, the ladder starting with Black *a* would not work. However, if the ladder is unfavourable Black can play 21 at 1 in *Dia. 5*. The result up to 5 seems better for Black.

White might also play 6 of *Dia. 4* on the other side, at 6 in *Dia. 6*. After 13 Black still has superior outside influence.


The joseki variation chosen in the game is, after 16, locally a loss for Black, but he is able to recoup the loss in the corner with the ideal pincer 17.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6





Fig. 3 (18-30)

Fig. 3 The Niceties of Fuseki

White 18 is a good move, treating $\triangle$ lightly. If it is at 25 instead, it will be difficult to cope with the thickness Black has already obtained on the lower side. White 1 to 5 in *Dia. 7* are no good either, although they do give White a reasonable shape locally. After Black 6 White would probably seal off the corner with 7, but the point is, White 3 and 5 are thickness building moves, yet this thickness has no effect in view of the strong black structure already there.

White 18 and 20 make much more sense, developing along the left side with a secure base, and sacrificing if need be. And so, if Black 21 is at 24, White would again ignore the bottom left corner and take the top corner instead with A. Then White would be bound to get either of the two



Dia. 7

Dia. 8

important points B or C, and Black would seem to be somewhat over-concentrated on the lower side.

Black 21 prevents White from sealing off the corner with A, but it gives White the chance to move out at 22.

White 24 can be at 1 in *Dia. 8*. If so, he will hem Black nicely into the corner and have good shape on the outside, but Black will be able to extend to 8.

White did not like this, though, and let Black run out into the centre with 25, so that he could get the pincer at 30. Black will be satisfied since all his routes to the centre are open.





Fig. 4 (30-41)


Fig. 4 One Line Difference

Again Black 31 and 33 are the proper answer to the pincer at 30. It is no good playing Black 1 to 5 in *Dia. 9*. Because of the two white stones $\triangle$ Black will find it hard to breathe and White can look forward to a nice attack with *a*.


Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 10* are not quite the same as *a* and *b*, that is 31 and 33 in the game, although they do develop the upper side. White would secure the corner this time, with 2 and 4, and allow Black to make a double wing formation with 5. This is satisfactory for White because 1 and 3 are now too close to his thickness and they leave White some room to invade at the top. In the game, if White 32 had been at 35, followed by Black 33, White A, Black 34, Black would have had a much better position. Note, by the way, that in *Dia. 10* Black 5 is held back because of White's thickness in the lower right corner.



Dia. 9



Dia. 11



Dia. 10

Since Black takes one side of the ideal double wing formation with 31 and 33, White must stop him getting the other side with 34. However, this gives Black an opportunity to move out at 35. White 36 at B would have been good shape (which is a phrase we use to denote that stones are arranged in such a way that all the vital points are guarded) but Black could then have hemmed him in with C. This would be intolerable.

The exchange of 37 for 38 was always Black's privilege. Now seems a reasonable time to play it.

White 40 is a cool move. The hane at 1 in *Dia. 11* merely gives Black good shape with 6. White 3 at *a* doesn't help either. Black 6, White *b*, Black *c* and Black has a clear road to the centre.





Fig. 5 (41-51)

Fig. 5 A Slack Move


In this figure White made just one slack move and as a result got an inferior game. It was White 42 that caused all the trouble. White 1 in *Dia. 12*, connecting underneath, was correct. If Black answers 3 with *a*, White obviously cuts at *b*, so Black 4 and White 5 are really inevitable. It was not like Chitoku to overlook such moves; he must have been lulled into a false sense of security by the abstemious White 42.

The "W" shape created by White 42 and 44 looks bad. White 44 is, nevertheless, not at A for a very good reason. If he does play A, after Black B, White C, Black D is sente and Black can then aim at E.


Black 45 is a good point. Black 1 in *Dia. 13* is not on a large enough scale. White would sound out Black's response



Dia. 12



Dia. 14



Dia. 13

with 2 and 4 before coming out at 6. If White 6 is at *a*, Black has a good erasing move at *b*. White 6 is more urgent. The idea behind 2 and 4 is to aim at *d* after the atari at *c*, and White 6 is a prerequisite to building up the moyo like this.

White 46 at F would be rather mediocre. Black would play G and his moyo would be better than White's.

White 48 and 50 erase Black's moyo but Chitoku had to think hard here. White 50 at 1 in *Dia. 14* is more natural, but after Black 8 White is paralysed. In this sequence, if Black pushes through at 5 instead of 2, White gets good shape with White *a*, Black *b*, White *c*.




Fig. 6 (51-65)


Fig. 6 Black Goes Ahead

Because of White's slack move in the last figure the game has turned in Black's favour. His overall thickness will continue to exert its influence till the very end of the game.


Running away lightly with Black 51 and White's peep at 52 are natural and from now on the real fighting starts.

Black 57 is the vital point. It anticipates White 58 and combined with Black 59 it is a rather tesuji-like way of playing. If White 58 is at A with the idea of pushing up even further, an awkward cutting point would be left behind at B. White 58, in fact, is what we call an 'honest move', that is a move that is the most correct even if it appears lukewarm at first sight.

If White cuts at 1 in *Dia. 15*, he will be the one to suffer after Black 6, as the black stone is a thorn in his side. White



Dia. 15




Dia. 16

64 surely rubs salt in his own wounds.

Dia. 16 This White 1 and 3 are better than making a spurious connection. White 3 at *a*, followed by Black *b*, White *c*, Black *d* and White *e*, also seems possible.

Black 65 is a good move. Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 17* instead are strong but look too small. White can defend at 6 and 8 and look forward to exploiting the cut at *a*. This seems like a rather untidy way for Black to play.



Dia. 17




Fig. 7 (65-84)

Fig. 7 Endgame Technique


Black 65 is good mainly because it promises the nice sente move at 75. This is the tidy way.

The White 66-Black 67 exchange is an endgame technique that is well worth learning. Because it is sente it is often played in the middle game too. The exchange has little value in itself, but if it is not played Black might get a chance to descend to 66, aiming at big sente plays starting with 82.


White 66 not only prevents this, but it also ensures that Black can only play here in gote.

The order of playing after White 68 has a point of interest. If White 70 is at A, Black would play at 70 because the cut at B doesn't work for White.


White 74 looks strange but it had to be this low. Why?



Dia. 18



Dia. 19



Dia. 20

White 1 in *Dia. 18* looks okay as White only has to yield a little to Black 2 and 4. Note the sacrifice at White 3 to ensure the connection underneath at 7 and 9. Black, however, has a better answer to White 1, namely 2 in *Dia. 19*. After Black 10 White has given away too much. If White 5 is at 7, then Black 9, White 5, Black 8.

Dia. 20 White 3 is strong resistance to Black 2 but after Black 8 to 12, White's territory has been destroyed. This is why White 74 was inevitable.

Black 75 is the follow up to 65. It tidies up the loose ends of the black group above, but it has the added attraction of being sente, in that it threatens the six white stones below. White has to play 76 to 80 to be sure of life.

Black 81 and 83 are worth about 12 points but they are gote. And they are gote only because of White 66.





Fig. 8 (84-103)

Fig. 8 Safeguarding Territory


White 84 surrounds a large territory, but clearly White is still behind. Overall both sides have more or less the same amount of territory, but Black has greater thickness and therefore more likelihood of making more territory in the future.

Black 85 is sente and already Black has his eyes on a fair-sized territory in the centre, thanks, of course, to his thickness there. After his little stab at 85, Black now plunges his sword right in at Black 89 and gouges out a huge chunk of White's territory. There is no way you can lose if you can play like this all the time. If White 90 is at 91 then Black A, White 90, Black B, and White is really up the creek.

No matter how reluctant he might be, White has to defend at 94. If he doesn't, his group on the left will suffer.



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

Dia. 21 First Black peeps at 1, and if White connects Black 3 ruins his eye shape. Even if White does live, it's going to be with the barest two eyes in gote. Losing territory like this will only precipitate the end.

Black 95 is sente for a similar reason. If White omits 96 and 98, Black 1, then the monkey jump 3 in *Dia. 22*, are very difficult to cope with satisfactorily. White 96 and 98 are not just a question of life and death; they are essential to safeguard about 10 points of territory.

Black 99 and 101 are another bit of tidying up, and Black is doing quite nicely, thank you.

Black 103, right up against White's stone, gives him a choice of invading White's territory on the right or strengthening his own moyo in the centre.




Fig. 9 (103-128)

Fig. 9 Confusion in the Centre

White 4 is the common sense answer to Black 3. White 4 at A would be lacking in ambition and if he lets Black play at 4, the centre would be well nigh Black's territory. If, after White A, Black 4, White plays B, he is stopped by Black C, White D, Black 18.

Also, if White 4 is at C, Black can cut at 4. Then if White captures the black stone with B, not only is he stopped from getting into the centre by Black D, White A, Black 16, but there is ko to worry about.

White 4 is clearly quite natural, and in fact the exchange of Black 3 and White 4 is, in itself, good for White. But Black 3 also aimed at reducing White's territory on the right and White has to give way there by sacrificing at 6 to ensure the connection at 12. Black has thus pushed

White back in sente and captured one stone (White 6) into the bargain. This was big.

If White doesn't sacrifice at 6 and simply plays 10, Black can cut at E. Then if White F, obviously Black ataris at 12, follows up with a connection at 11, and captures three stones. Also, after White 10 and Black E, if White plays 11, Black ataris at 8 and he successfully encroaches upon White's territory—all thanks to Black 3.

The loss caused by letting White poke out at 4 is recouped by the profit up to Black 11.

With 15 Black makes his intention of surrounding the centre perfectly clear.

Black 19 is a little bit odd. If this move is at 20 Black gets over ten points of territory in the centre without any trouble. In contrast White's cut at 20 in the game is quite a nuisance. White first tidies up loose ends with 22 to 26 then moves out at 28. This looks like the last fight.

Black still has better prospects of getting more territory, but why did he play 19? Maybe he'd been at the bottle.

It seems that our Honinbo Genjo was fond of the choicest *sake*. His two predecessors, Meijin Satsugen and Retsugen, were leading lives of luxury at Genjo's expense, but no matter how hard up he might be Genjo never missed his daily *sake*. He had a pupil, Ito Matsujiro (of whom more later), who was obviously even more hard up, but one day poor Ito gave Genjo his last few coppers in return for a teaching game. Genjo's reaction was, "Poor as he is, Matsujiro can still do this for me. I'm touched. But dammit, it's not even enough to buy one bottle of *sake*." Or so the story goes. At least it shows how much he liked his tippie.




Fig. 10 (128-149)

Fig. 10 Black's Centre Territory Disappears


White runs away at 28 and from then on up to White 46, he lays waste to Black's moyo in the centre with no problems at all. He even has time in the middle to rescue one of his stones with 42, as a sort of bonus.

It is not too bad for Black, though. He captures the two white stones 30 and 32 and captures another stone in sente with 47. Finally he has sente to take the 4-point gyaku yose of Black 49. All in all, it hasn't been a one-sided exchange in White's favour. The reason Black 49 is a gyaku yose (i.e. gote preventing a sente play by the opponent) is that if White plays 49, Black has to play A.

White has to make the apparently wasteful moves 30 and 32. If White 30 is simply at 33, Black connects at 32 and White is stranded. After White 30 Black ends

up having to make an extra move at 39, so that White has time to secure life.

It is an interesting problem to work out what happens if Black plays 29 at 1 in *Dia. 23*. Once again White can live by connecting to a friendly group. White 2 to 8 are forcing moves and then White 10 is the clever move. White can now connect at either *a* or *b*. How-



Dia. 23

ever, after White 10, Black *c*, White *b*, Black can play *d*, so the spoils will be divided more or less as in the game.

There is an interesting sidelight on Chitoku's attitude to go. He had a son, Sanchi (7-dan, 1810-1858), who was one of the Tempo Four and who later succeeded him as the 9th head of the Yasui family (note that the second head was also called Sanchi). This Sanchi was a very strong go player and astonishingly handsome to boot, but he dissipated his life in wine, women and song. He would even don his father's best clothes, say he was going out teaching, and return minus the clothes but with money to buy drink. Even on the night before castle games he would drink himself into a stupor and cause his colleagues endless embarrassment, yet Papa Sanchi never said a word against it. But just let Sanchi lose a game by playing badly, then he really was for the high jump.




Fig. 11 (149-186)

Fig. 11 The Game is Settled

By now the outcome of the game has been settled and I would imagine that by around Black 49 both players knew Black was going to win by 9 points.

White 50 is worth about 10 points in gote. It is slightly bigger than the gyaku yose of Black 49 (worth 4 points as a gyaku yose, therefore equivalent to an 8-point gote play), but Black preferred 49 because it also gets rid of some loose ends that might cause trouble later.

White 70 is worth about 5 points in gote. Black 81 to 85 are natural but then there is an endgame problem. White switched to 86 (correctly) and left Black A behind. The reason is that if he doesn't play 86, then Black B, White C, Black 86, White D, Black E would be a big sente sequence for Black. In other words, White 86 is a gyaku yose of just under 3 points and so is the largest play on the board.




Fig. 12 (186-231)

White wins $\frac{1}{2}$ -point ko & fills it
231 moves. Black Wins by 9 points.

Fig. 12 A Game To Forget


If White answers Black 87 with A, Black gets a ko with Black B, White C, Black D—a ko in which Black stands to lose nothing. So White has to play 88. Now if Black captures at A immediately it is worth 4 points in gote. Instead he chose 89 (that and 95 are worth pretty much the same), but there was a good reason for playing the 87-88 exchange all the same. If he doesn't play it, there is the possibility that White will play C, which means that a play at 87 is no longer a threat, because White can then answer at A. However, if Black plays 87 first (and doesn't capture straightaway at A), White has to play 102 instead of C to nullify Black's threat here. This gives Black the chance, albeit a remote one, of gaining a point by playing 126 and forcing White to fill in at C.

This game was probably one that Chitoku wanted to forget.

A Brilliant Waste of a Move

The figure below shows a game between Genjo and Chitoku in April 1812. Black 69, played by Chitoku, is one of the most famous moves ever made. In fact, this move defends against a cut that White can't even play yet, and is tantamount to filling in a *dame*. There is a theory that Black played it to make sure of the eye at A and thus to hint that White should resign. The game looks fairly close, but there was no komi so Black would have no trouble in winning.

155 moves. White resigns.



Black: Yasui Chitoku
White: Honinbo Genjo

100	takes ko	70	114	"	"	85	118	"	"	105
110	"	"	78	116	"	"	86	121	fills ko	79
111	"	"	105	119	"	"	106	122	"	127

Game 5: BEST GAME OF THE ERA

Played on 10th and 30th April, 14th and 15th May 1820

White: Yasui Senchi

Black: Honinbo Jowa

Yasui Senchi is the Nakano Chitoku of the previous game after he had changed his name. Do not confuse him with Yasui Senchi Senkaku, or with the heir to the 4th Yasui, Hasegawa Senchi (7-dan, 168?-1728).

Honinbo Jowa (1787-1847) was the 12th head of the Honinbo family. His real name was Todani. It is not certain where he was born, but it is said to be either Honjo in Bushu or Mizunuma in Shinshu. He was appointed heir to the Honinbo title in 1819 and succeeded in 1827, being promoted to 8-dan the following year.

The second quarter of the 19th century was marked by a struggle among the four giants of the go world at that time for promotion to Meijin. Jowa, Senchi, Inoue Genan Inseki and Hayashi Genbi (1778-1861), who were all 8-dan, vied secretly for the promotion, which carried with it the lucrative headship of the State Go Academy. Jowa's intrigues were the most successful and he was appointed Meijin in 1831, without playing a single game against the others. Genbi, however, exposed Jowa's string pulling and Senchi and Genan petitioned strongly for the promotion to be retracted. Finally Jowa resigned in 1838 and

retired soon after. It was said later that the reason Shuwa, Jowa's heir, did not become Meijin was because of a curse due to the unreasonableness of the Honinbo family in the 1830's.

The game here took place several years before the secret struggle just mentioned, and at the time Jowa was at the peak of his powers. In later years he reminisced, "That was a time when of course I won won games, but I won lost games as well." Three games between Jowa and Senchi have survived (Jowa was Black in all of them) and they are all marvellous games, but this one is particularly famous. It was Sekiyama Sendaiyu (5-dan, 1783-1859) who gave it the name 'Best Game of the Era'. Jowa won this and the other two games but he is said to have been terrified of 'old man' Senchi.





Fig. 1 (1-9)


Fig. 1 Regulation Fuseki

The crosswise formation of Black 1 and 3 and White 2 and 4 is called the 'regulation fuseki', because it was almost the standard opening of the early 19th century. The pattern up to Black 9 was a very common continuation. We can see here the origins of the 'Shusaku style' of fuseki.

It is, of course, possible to play Black 9 at 1 in *Dia. 1*, forcing White 2 so as to be able to attack from the back with 3 and 5. This would be the modern approach. Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2* are also possible.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2





Fig. 2 (9-23)

Fig. 2 Classical Joseki


White 10 would nowadays probably be at 1 in *Dia. 3* and Black would play a pincer somewhere on the top edge. Because of the thinness of White's position Black can easily settle himself here. The variation up to White 13 is one example.

Black resists with 11, the *aigosumi* joseki (*aigosumi* means mutual diagonal moves) and the sequence up to Black 23 is a classical variation dating from that period. It is hardly ever played nowadays, but that is not because there is anything odd about it. I have also seen games with the same fuseki as here except that White 12 was at 1 in *Dia. 4*. I can recall one such game between Genan and Yasui Sanchi, and the next few moves in their game are shown in the diagram up to White 11.

全后録
七折




⑨ fills
Dia. 3



Dia. 4

If White dislikes the variation of the joseki played in the game, he can simply extend to 1 in *Dia. 5* on move 16. If Black blocks at 2, White jumps to 3, which is a calm and composed way of playing. However, if Black jumps to 3 on move 2, White has to play *a* and it would revert back to the sequence of the actual game. The result up to Black 23 is even.



Dia. 5





Fig. 3 (23-37)

Fig. 3 The Pros and Cons of the Peep


Black's jump at 25 perhaps simplifies the game a little bit too much. Many people have wondered why he didn't peep at 26 instead.

Dia. 6 If he plays the jump at 3 after the peep at 1, White would probably play 4. It is thought that Jowa didn't like this. As the sequence cascades up to White 20, a big ko fight develops. However, White 24 is a good move and Black then has no hope of winning the ko. At this early stage of the game Black has no ko threats, but if he had omitted the Black 1-White 2 exchange that would be a ko threat, then it would be White who is left with no ko threats. If Black 25 of *Dia. 6* is at 1 in *Dia. 7*, White 2 and 4 spell disaster for Black.


If Black rushes to take the ko at 1 in *Dia. 8* instead of his



26 takes ko
Dia. 6



Dia. 7



3 fills
Dia. 8

21 in *Dia. 6*, Black loses the race to capture after White 10.

Perhaps this is what Jowa had in mind when he played Black 25. In spite of this, or rather just because of it, White 26 is a splendid move. White can now hem Black in at A but this is not so terrible for Black now, because he can live at B and he has managed to play 27 in the meantime.

White's extension to 28 in answer to Black 27 was a good move typical of Senchi. If he plays 29 instead, obviously Black will grab 28. The sequence from Black 29 to White 36 leaves White slightly over-concentrated and, of course, locally this is a loss for him, but he has compensation. He has 15 points of certain territory, he has occupied the important point 28, and he can occupy next either 37 or C, depending on which of these two points Black takes.





Fig. 4 (37-49)

Fig. 4 Modern Style

White 38 is just what Senchi had planned, but the modern style would be to deny him this point, by playing 1 in *Dia. 9*, followed by the cut at 3. It gives White a lot of territory but the moyo produced by Black 15 (not *a*—that is too close to the stronger thickness at the top) is very attractive. At least this would be one way of dictating how the game should go. The actual 37 lets White give the orders.


Black 1 in *Dia. 10* would also be playing into White's hands. White settles the situation here in sente, making Black over-concentrated in the process, and gets to the important point 16 first.

White 42 at A seems logical but Senchi thought the crawl at 42 was bigger. I think he was right. It would be terrible to let Black block at 42. Black naturally gets the exchange of 43 for 44 as compensation.




Dia. 9

Black 47 could also be simply 1 in *Dia. 11*. If White 2, Black 3 brings us back to the actual game.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11





Fig. 5 (49-59)

Fig. 5 A Short Skirmish

If White 52 is at 53, he is captured with Black A. Black 53 at 1 in *Dia. 12* seems more normal. By sacrificing two stones and squeezing he can turn to 7 to ensure a large territory. Presumably, however, Jowa disliked handing over control to White like this and leaving himself relatively weak in the top half of the board. Instead he chose a strategy that drove White out into the centre. Black 55 is the vital point.


Dia. 13 Playing 1 and so on is bad style. The reason is that later White can play *a* to stabilise himself and ruin Black's shape. Maybe, though, this way of playing could be excused in view of the exceptional circumstances.

White 58 shows Senchi's strong point. He has the knack of stretching that little bit further and picking up points on




Dia. 12

the way. Most people would hold back at 1 in *Dia. 14*. This, however, lets Black turn at 4. White's group has no body to it and is just straggling out to the centre, and the black stone $\triangle$ is occupying White's vital point. It might not be too much to say that White has a lost game in *Dia. 14*.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14




Fig. 6 (59-77)


Fig. 6 The Fighting Spreads

Black 59 is an exquisite tesuji. Even though this has been a short skirmish, we have already seen two examples of superior style, with White 58 (△ here) and this Black 59.


Dia. 15 Black 1 is no good in this case. If White pushes straight on with 2 and 4, the five black stones just below become very weak. Also, the thickness produced by Black 1 and 3 doesn't exert so much influence on the white group at the top as Black 63 and 65 do in the game.

Another reason why the sequence up to 61 is so pleasing to Black is that if he had jumped out to 61 on move 57 and White attached at 60, if now Black played 59, White would not extend to △, but would play hane at 57. The result in the game is clearly better than this.

After Black 65 White's group on the upper side has become very thin, but in compensation White has got the cap at



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

66, so these negotiations can be considered to have ended in a fair exchange.

Rather than simply run away in the face of Black's attack at 67, White first played 68 to sound out Black's response. To maintain the attack on White Black has to connect at 69, but this leaves White the possibility of living in the corner with A. If White waits until after clarifying the situation with White 70 to Black 77 before playing 68, then Black might defend at 2 in *Dia. 16* to emphasise territory, reasoning that the white group is now safe and not worth attacking. In fact, White 7 even makes the white group over-concentrated.

Extending out to 77 undeniably gives Black an advantage in the fighting in the middle of the board, but in return White has more territory. Senchi is displaying here his mastery of a high class strategic concept called *amashi* in Japanese. *Amashi* is a strategy in which over the board as a whole you allow your opponent to come at you and make him feel strong while planning to catch him unawares when he is overstretched. Senchi and Shuwa of the old masters and Rin Kaiho and Ishida of the modern masters excel in this technique.




Fig. 7 (77-89)

Fig. 7 *Reaping the Harvest*

With White 78 we can see how Black has become over-stretched in the corner and how White nips in behind him to grab even more territory. The effect of △ is now apparent. Black's reply at 79 and 81 is natural. If Black were to block carelessly at A, White would play 81 and gouge out *all* of Black's territory here.

Black 85 weakens the ten white stones in the centre, so Black has something to be pleased about, but White has anticipated this 85 and moves out in good shape with 86 and 88. Black has been led a bit of a dance in the lower left quarter of the board, but he is first to Black 89, the important point for both attack and defence over the whole board. It cannot be denied that White's positions are rather thin, and the game will hang on whether or not Black can exploit this.





Fig. 8 (89-101)

Fig. 8 *Black Wins By 2 Points*

White 94 and Black 95 are both safety-seeking moves and White 96 is a good point to occupy in anticipation of the forthcoming fight. There will be a very considerable difference if Black gets this point instead; White's group stretching from the centre to the right-hand side would probably be split in two.

After a little bit of tidying up at 97 and 99, Black plunges in with 101. Jowa spent three hours on this one move and he is said to have worked out all the remaining moves of the game. In other words he knew he was going to win by 2 points.

If White 98 is at 1 in *Dia. 17* he will lose the chance of



Dia. 17

playing *a* with the threat of connecting, a chance which is afforded by 98 in the game.





Fig. 9 (101-117)

Fig. 9 Devastation on the Upper Side

Upon seeing Black 1 Senchi in turn settled down to think and he spent three hours on White 2. Once he has played this though, the sequence up to 8 is quite natural. If, instead of Black 3, Black ataris at 1 in *Dia. 18*, eventually White connects underneath at 8 and after Black 9 White's group is in dire straits. However, instead of connecting at 2, White can extend to 5, seal off the edge, let Black capture at 2, and then live at 9. This is no good for Black.

If Black 7 of the game is at 1 in *Dia. 19*, it is too optimistic. White 6 is a forcing move, then White has to play 8 to live. If Black persists in trying to kill White, he will only get into hot water himself.


After Black 9 of the game White has little prospect of



much territory at the top. But what a marvellous move White 12 is.

Dia. 20 Simple connection at 1 fails against Black 2 and 4. If White 3 is at 4, Black plays 3. Or if White 3 is at *a*, then Black 6.

If Black 13 is at 1 in *Dia. 21*, White 2 is now possible because $\triangle$ has filled in one of Black's liberties and the connection along the edge is completed by White 6. Black 13 to White 16 is therefore a natural consequence.







Fig. 10 (116-133)

Fig. 10 Fair Shares


After White 16 Black gets his reward by cutting at 17, which eliminates the need to connect at A. This is a simple, and good, variation, but Black could also prolong the fight by playing 17 at 18, which is followed by White A, Black B, White 17, Black C, White D.

It is far too messy for White to play 1 in *Dia. 22* instead of his 20 in the hope of capturing Black. Black 6 makes life awkward for him because this is now a multi-step ko (or *yose ko* if you prefer) and Black can make the moves 8, 10 and 12 in sente. Even if White does capture Black in the end his profit will be next to nothing.


White 20 is therefore prudent and, since Black has to connect at 21 to live, it is sente. Considering how thin White was here in the first place, the spoils have been fairly evenly divided.




Dia. 22



Dia. 23



Dia. 24



Dia. 25

White 24 is very big (but White 22 first is the right order). It expects Black 27, to which White defends with 28. The game is now very, very close.

White 1 in *Dia. 23*, instead of White 28, is a forcing move, but when White defends at 3 it invites Black to push out and cut with 4 to 8. Also, if White 28 is at 33, Black plays either 28 or E. If Black 31 is the simple peep at 1 in *Dia. 24*, White can extricate himself easily with White 8. Black 7 at *a* is of course answered by White *b*. This diagram is ideal for White, but it only works for him if he omits the forcing move at 31 (1 in *Dia. 23*). Conversely, it is now to Black's advantage to play a forcing move at 31.

If Black 31 is at 1 in *Dia. 25* so as to connect along the edge, the result is similar to that of the game. If White 2 is at 4, then Black 2, White 6 and this is no good for White.





Fig. 11 (133-155)


Fig. 11 The Effects of Thickness

After Black 31 and 33 White decided to trade thickness for profit. He would like to play White 34 at 1 in *Dia. 26*, but Black would push out at 2 and 4 regardless and have White in a stranglehold. White *a* would be met by Black *b* and the exchange of  for  becomes effective. White doesn't have much hope of making two eyes with either *c* or *d*.

White 36 ekes out even more profit. Black cannot answer at 1 in *Dia. 27* because, after White 10, the best he can do is to make a ko with Black *a*, White *b*, but Black has so many cutting points on the outside, such as *c*, he can hardly expect to win this ko. *Dia. 26* differs greatly from this, because there, after White *d*, Black *e*, Black can guarantee life at *f*. White 4 in *Dia. 27* gives him no such scope.



Dia. 26



Dia. 27

In view of the above, Black cut at 37 and White settled himself from White 38 to 50 with around 6 points of territory.

It is skilful play to interpose the forcing moves of White 40 and 42, thus guaranteeing one eye with White A, now that Black has made a powerful wall on the right with 39.

Even though White has earned some extra territory, Black has developed great thickness up to 47 and after 51 (a fine move) to 55, it is evident that Black is making profit of his own on account of the ominous presence of his wall.





Fig. 12 (155-171)

Fig. 12 Fifteen Points

The game has now entered its final phase and Black has the advantage of greater thickness. Black 55 to White 60 is sente, (and both the capture at A and the push at B remain for Black), and so Black gets to the last really big endgame play, 61 and 63, first. In terms of territory alone this is worth about 15 points. White 64 forces 65, then the slide at 68 is a good move. If Black 69 is at 1 in *Dia. 28*, the right order for White to play is 2 then 4. If Black tries to extricate $\triangle$, White *a* looks like a nice move. In view of this, Black 69, building thickness, was a good play.

White also chose a very thick move at 70, even though it meant losing time to go back here. It is impossible to say how many points this sort of move is worth.



Dia. 28





Fig. 13 (171-201)

Fig. 13 The Bits and Pieces

If White answers Black 71 with 1 in *Dia. 29*, Black will jump to 2. White's cut at 3 then proves catastrophic. If White 3 is at 6, then Black 3, White *a*. Black has still encroached and White 1 is meaningless.

Black 77 is his privilege. Black 79 and White 80 are virtually interchangeable. White 82 is a necessary answer to Black 81 to ensure two eyes. Black 83 and 85 and White 88 are also virtually interchangeable but Black 83 and 85 are a fraction bigger.

Black 89, White 94 and White 96 are all sente, and with these moves all the important sente endgame plays have been settled.



Dia. 29





Fig. 14 (201-229)

Fig. 14 *A Game to Appreciate*

From now on all the endgame plays are worth 2 or 3 points.

Although Black wins this famous old game, one of the things most appreciated in it nowadays is White's use of the amashi strategy. Three games between Senchi and Jowa remain, and judging by these, if they were to play on even terms to decide who should be the Meijin, the outcome would be very unclear.


There is an unfinished game of 119 moves played in 1822 between Jowa and Toyama Sansetsu (6-dan) and in later years Jowa said that if they had played it out he would have won by one point. Sansetsu, on the other hand, who was Black, claimed that he would have won by 3 points. Senchi's supporters mocked this and asserted that Senchi would have won if he had been either Black or White.




Black wins both $\frac{1}{2}$ -point kos & fills them
Fig. 15 (229-259)

Fig. 15 *End of the Game*

Black 41 is skilful. If White plays elsewhere, Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 30* are sente. Assuming that Black will get to play at *a*, White's territory would be worth 5 points. If White gets *a* first his territory is worth 6 points, so splitting the difference we say his territory in *Dia. 30* is worth $5\frac{1}{2}$ points. By defending at 44, White makes his territory worth 7 points. In other words, Black 1 and 3 are worth $1\frac{1}{2}$ points in sente, so White 44 is a gyaku yose worth $1\frac{1}{2}$ points too.




Dia. 30



Dia. 31

Dia. 31 This Black 1 and 3 instead of Black 41, assuming Black *a* and White *b*, also leave White with 7 points of territory, but Black is in gote. In the game Black got sente. 259 moves. Black wins by 2 points.



Pure Bunkum

This is the position in the game above where Black played 101 and White 102. Of these two moves Sekiyama Sendaiyu wrote, "... astonishingly Jowa worked out the rest of the game after Black 101. On seeing this move Senchi's blood curdled; he knew he could not win. He strained every sinew in the hope of reducing the losing margin from 2 points to 1 point, but there was no way. ..."

This is indeed a difficult phase in this game and it is no wonder that both players spent three hours on their respective moves, but Sekiyama's tale about reducing 2 points to 1 point and the rest is pure bunkum designed simply to impress later generations.

Game 6: JOWA, THE GRAND CHAMPION

Played on 17th November 1822 in the Shogun's Palace
White: Inoue Insa Inseki
Black: Honinbo Jowa

Inoue Insa Inseki (1785–1829) was born in Iwami to the same family that produced the 4th Honinbo, Dosaku. His real name was thus Yamazaki. He was apprenticed to the 8th Inoue, Intatsu Inseki and eventually, in 1810, became the 10th Inoue. He played 11 castle games and the game here is one of them. In 1824 he ceded the headship of the Inoue family to his heir, Ansetsu, and went into retirement. He reached 6-dan.

This Ansetsu was later to become the famous 11th Inoue, *Genan Inseki*. It is not directly relevant to this game, but since Genan is featured in Game 7 and his story is closely bound up with that of Jowa, we will permit ourselves a slight digression and introduce him here.

Inoue Genan Inseki (1798–1859) was extremely fond of changing his name. His real name was Hashimoto and he was of samurai stock. At the age of 6 he became a pupil of Hattori Inshuku (6-dan, 1761–1842) and took the name

Intetsu, which he later changed to Rittetsu. He was not the Intetsu of the Red Ear game by the way. That was Akaboshi Intetsu, his pupil. In 1819 he became heir to the 10th Inoue, Insa, and changed his name yet again, this time to Inoue Ansetsu. This was the year in which he played his first castle game. He took two stones from Honinbo Genjo and won by 1 point in a game that was to become known as Genjo's Masterpiece. In 1824 he became head of the Inoue family and changed his name for the final time. In 1828 he was promoted to 8-dan. For the next decade he vied with Jowa for appointment as Meijin but it was Jowa who was successful in 1831. Seven years later Jowa resigned his appointment without promising to pass it on to Genan. In 1839 Genan therefore submitted an application for the post, but the 13th Honinbo, Josaku (1803-1847), ineligible himself since he was only 7-dan, proposed that Genan should first play the Honinbo heir, Shuwa. The first game of a scheduled 20-game match was played in 1840. Shuwa, as Black, won by 4 points. Dismayed by Shuwa's strength Genan declined to play the rest of the match and withdrew his application. Two years later he was again pitted against Shuwa, but lost that game too. Nevertheless, his great rival, Jowa, commenting on this second Genan-Shuwa game, said, "Genan is strong enough to be Meijin. It is a pity that he was born at the wrong time."

There are four players who were reckoned to have been strong enough to be Meijin, but who never got beyond 8-dan. Apart from Genan these were: Genjo, Chitoku, and Shuwa. They are called the 'Four Sages'. If all four were to play each other, Shuwa would probably win the most often and Genan would lose the most often.




Fig. 1 (1-9)

Fig. 1 One Step Ahead

At the time of this game Jowa is thought to have been, like Insa, 6-dan, and so this would be an even game (i.e. Black and White alternately, no komi), but some people believe that Jowa had already inched ahead to 7-dan. If this is so, this game would be the one game in three in which Jowa took Black. It was, incidentally, Insa's last castle game. Including the game here his results were 4 wins, 5 losses and 2 draws.

In this game Insa, who was White, developed a very large moyo, but, as in real life, he was destined to remain one step behind Jowa.

When there are two opposing corner enclosures as there are here, on the right-hand side of the board, the point A becomes very important for both players. A play here is almost as valuable as a play in a corner, and it must be taken into account as the two players make their next few moves.





Fig. 2 (9-15)

Fig. 2 Modern Feeling

The joseki from Black 9 to White 12 is just the same now as it was then. You might be wondering about Black 1 in *Dia. 1*. White would likely choose the large-scale joseki of 2 to 19, and he would be first to the good point of 20. Here, this move has the additional merit of counteracting Black's thickness and White has a big profit in the top left-hand corner.


Black, therefore, chooses the joseki of the actual game before making the corner enclosure at 13. This move has to be high. Playing low as in *Dia. 2* is no good. After Black 3 (not *a*), White 4 and 6 make Black's position on the left too low.

Having allowed White 14, Black must obviously take 15. It would be bad to let White get a double wing formation with A. Nevertheless, the modern feeling about Black 15 is that it should be one line higher at B, after which Black can aim at C.



Dia. 1

However, according to present-day theory, Black 15 would be perfect if White had played the small corner enclosure at D.



Dia. 2




Fig. 3 (15-23)


Fig. 3 Getting Good Shape

The idea of going as far as White 16 is so as to be able to attack Black at A. White B would be too slow for that purpose.


Black 1 in *Dia. 3* instead of the severe 17 is bad shape. If White treads carefully and comes in at 2, he can break the game up into lots of small fights and make it close. If, instead, he barges right in at 2 in *Dia. 4*, he will just make himself a prime target for attack with Black 3 to 7.

The sequence White 18 to 22 is virtually joseki. Some people prefer to play White 20 at 1 in *Dia. 5*, but that's not for me. White's objective is to force Black to play 2 so that he can go to 3, but Black can exploit the cutting point at *c*, especially by pushing at *a* or probing at *b*. This seems a bit wishy-washy for White.


Jowa must have been quite concerned about where to play Black 23.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 6 If he chooses to restrain the single white stone with this 1, White will push at 2 and then invade at 4. Because of the additional thickness given by White 2, White's plan of playing at A in the figure would become even better. Even so, it would have made life a little easier for Black if he had played this way.



Dia. 6





Fig. 4 (23-33)

Fig. 4 A Lost Opportunity


In this figure Insa overlooked a valuable opportunity to make his group on the left safe from attack for the time being, and as a consequence he had to weather an incessant attack.

He started off the right way with the clever move of White 24. This helps the lone white stone, erases Black's moyo, aims at hemming Black in with 25, and threatens to cut later at A—a real multi-purpose move. If it is at 32 instead, Black plays B to seal off territory and White's attack has already run out of steam with nothing to show for it.

If Black rushes to build a moyo on the lower left side, after the forcing move at 2 in *Dia. 7*, White will cut at 4, or perhaps even hem Black in with *a*. Either way White gets a nice position.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Black accordingly chose 25 to get out into the open, but then White erred with 26. This move negates the value of White 24.

Dia. 8 The way for White to make himself safe from attack is to jump lightly to 1, following up with a move somewhere around 5. If Black 2 is at *a*, now is the time to play White *b* because now White is out into the open with 1. The master at making vague moves like this White 1 was Honinbo Shuwa. It is easy to see how you might miss such apparently lukewarm moves, though, if your style is to emphasise all-out fighting.

In this case, seeking a close-quarters confrontation with White 26 makes life difficult for White, rather than the other way round. White 30 and 32 are a roundabout attack aiming at confining Black to the corner by cutting at A, while settling White's own group.




Fig. 5 (33-45)

Fig. 5 A Cool Move

White 34 is a tesuji but Black 35 avoids the trap it sets.


Dia. 9 The trap is if Black cuts at 1. White hems him in with 6, enlarges his moyo with 10, and in general recovers the ground he lost earlier on.

Although White, by playing the hane at 34, is able to achieve the push at 36 and defend in good shape at 38, Black has no reason to be dissatisfied. With 39 he has breached White's enclosing wall.


White has to go back to play 40 and this loss of tempo is annoying for him.

Black 41 is a forcing move. It would be unbearable for White to let Black atari at 42, but the black moyo is growing.

The next move, Black 43, is also a forcing move but a



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

more skilful one. The problem with this kind of move is to know when to play it. The timing seems good in this case. If White answers at A instead of 44, Black can of course cut at B. With White 44 Black can later come out at A, so the stone at 43 still has a latent power.

Black 45 is a good, cool move, giving excellent thickness. If Black has time to play such cool moves he has obviously retained the advantage of having first move. If, for some reason, Black had not had time to play this move, White could have stirred things up a bit with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 10*. Then he would make eye shape with 5 and 7, leaving himself with the attack at *a*, the push at *c*, and a defect at *b* that he might be able to exploit. White could also play 1 at *d*, the vital point of Black's shape, with a view to living on the lower left side. This is simple but White's group just above would become rather thin.




Fig. 6 (45-49)


Fig. 6 A Dubious Move

The game is approaching a difficult phase. White 46 is my kind of move. If Black answers as in *Dia. 11*, the moyo White gets on the right-hand side is better than the black one on the left.

If Black answers White's cut at 4 with 5 and 7 in *Dia. 12*, to erase White's moyo, White 8 has the same effect on the black moyo but also has better shape. In addition it is giving White secure territory.

Black 47 is the best choice. Black can now erase White's moyo with C. Black 47 at A is not so good. White will play B and although White's position here is very thin, Black is nevertheless cut off from the centre.


White 48 is an important point and it backs up White 46, yet White cannot but have been reluctant to play it, because




Dia. 11

it has no direct effect on Black. The advantage of having played 45 before is now evident.

Black 49, however, was dubious and it gave White a golden opportunity—which he failed to seize. Black 49 at 1 in *Dia. 13* is clearly better. White will find it difficult to know how to reply. If, for instance, he blocks on the inside, Black cuts at 3 and after 13 he has achieved a separate base inside White's sphere of influence.



Dia. 12



Dia. 13




Fig. 7 (49-55)


Fig. 7 Playing Lightly

Normally in this kind of position Black's atari at 55 is a tesuji, but not here. Black 51 and 53 are alright, though. If Black 51 is at 52, White plays 51 and Black's group is left without a secure foundation. Black 53 at 54 is very bad shape.


But to go back to the real source of the trouble, Black 49 should have been at A.

Dia. 14 If White blocks on the outside, Black cuts at 3. If White plays 4, Black 5 is decisive and then follows the well-known driving tesuji of 7 and 9.

Dia. 15 If White responds to Black 1 and 3 with capture at 4, Black ataris at 5 and 7 then lightly skips out to 9, thus erasing White's moyo. If White cuts at *a*, Black should atari at *b* so that his group doesn't become heavy.



Dia. 14




Dia. 15


Dia. 16 White's most common reply is to pull out at 2 and had Black played 1 in the game, the sequence here is most likely what we would have seen. White can attack with 6 and 8, but of course Black is in no immediate danger.

Dia. 17 White 2 can also be considered. Black's simple shoulder attack seems like the best reply. Black 3 at *a* seems rather heavy compared to this.

In contrast to the above light ways of playing, Black 49 feels heavy and seems to be asking for trouble.



Dia. 16



Dia. 17





Fig. 8 (55-61)

Fig. 8 A Second Chance

White 56 gave Black a second chance to repair the damage done by Black 49. After the connection at 57 by Black and the moves up to 61, White can make very little out of this position.

Dia. 18 White should have connected quietly at 1. If Black in turn connects at 2, White captures a stone with 3 and 5. White 7, in answer to either Black 6 or Black *a*, helps the lone white stone and at the same time reduces Black's moyo. Moreover, the territory in the lower right corner is rather large. White would seem to have the better prospects in this case.

Dia. 19 If Black is concerned about territory and plays this way, White clearly gets the better game. After first exchanging 3 for 4, White attacks Black's corner enclosure



Dia. 18

Dia. 19

with 5. If Black answers at 6, White 7 to 15 make the moyo on the right-hand side enormous. This way of settling the position in the top right-hand corner is gote for White but it leaves very few loose ends for Black to grab hold of. White 11 to 15 is a common tesuji sequence. If Black 12 is at 13, White plays 12 and Black suffers even more. Of course, Black could play 4 at 5, but then White would press at 4.

If you compare *Dia. 18* with the game, you will see that, irrespective of any differences in sizes of territories, Black's group on the lower edge in *Dia. 18* is not very secure.





Fig. 9 (56-67)

Fig. 9 Time for Action


Insa presumably expected his atari at 56 to be answered by Black 1 in *Dia. 20*. Then White's connection at 2 and Black 3 and White 4 follow, but this is too good for White.

Black 57 is the right move and now White 58 cannot be at A as that would leave the cutting point at 58. Even so, White 1 in *Dia. 21* is a far superior alternative to White 58. The result up to 5 is similar to that of *Dia. 18*. The only difference is in the exchange of  for 2 and this is clearly a loss for White, but in spite of that it is still better than White 58.

White, however, did not capitalise on Black's poor move and now the time has come for him to rouse himself to action. He chose to hem Black in with White 62 to 66, so




Dia. 20



Dia. 21

that the game will now depend on what becomes of this thickness in the centre.

Black 67 is extremely large and so White might consider 1 in *Dia. 22*. However, after Black reinforces his position at the top with 2 to 8 and defends his territory at the bottom with 10, the prospective territories have become quite clear and Black seems to be about 10 points ahead here.



Dia. 22





Fig. 10 (67-75)

Fig. 10 Attacking the Corner Enclosure

Black 69 and 71 are very large, being worth over 20 points. The reason why White allowed these moves and played 68 is that if he stresses territory by blocking at A, Black will play 68 and his corner enclosure will become a fortress.

In all probability if White 74 is at B, Black will ignore it and play elsewhere. This is because even if White captures the two black stones with C, Black has the forcing moves of D and A, so that the stones 71 and 73 will have served their purpose as sacrifice stones. White 74, keeping its distance from the black group, is the strongest way to exert pressure.


Dia. 23 Going right up to White 1 is no good. White's most likely reply to Black 2 is at 3, but then Black could swap the corner for a territory on the side and devastate



Dia. 23 8 fills

White's moyo in the process. White cannot ignore the potential of Black's push at a.

Dia. 24 Usually it is good for Black to cut off White 3 at 4. This is when you want to emphasise territory. White builds strong thickness with 5 to 9, although Black seems to be able to steal into White's moyo inch by inch with moves like 10 and 12. After this it is not clear how the endgame would go but Black appears to be about 10 points down. The idea behind White 74 in the game, which is the most severe move, is to take away Black's base in the corner.



Dia. 24




Fig. 11 (75-89)


Fig. 11 One Weak Group

White scoops out Black's corner with 76 and now his sole aim is to attack this black group.


Black 79 is a good move. If he connects carelessly at 1 in *Dia. 25*, White will hane and connect on both sides in sente with 2 to 8 and this puts Black's group under very severe pressure. Black could probably live by playing 5 at *a* but he is really walking a tightrope.

White 80 is best. If he cuts at 1 in *Dia. 26*, after 3 he can capture the three black stones with 5, but Black can treat these as sacrifice stones and after Black 6 he is likely to secure life somehow.

Dia. 27 If Black 4 is answered by White 5, Black connects at 6. This becomes ko and is entirely to Black's satisfaction.




Dia. 25




Dia. 26

The combination of Black 81 and 83 is a basic tesuji. If Black simply connects at 83 without playing 81, White plays 81 and Black is left with no potential in this position. Also the probing move of 85, although natural enough, is very skilful. If White answers it at 1 in *Dia. 28*, Black will cut through at 2, happy in the knowledge that he has one eye guaranteed in the corner with *a*.

After 89 Black will be driven into White's moyo. The fight is on. White has to kill this group. If Black can make it live he will be far ahead in territory, and it seems likely that he will live.



Dia. 27



Dia. 28





Fig. 12 (89-109)

Fig. 12 Seeking Confusion

Realising that direct attack is a waste of time, White tries to build up his moyo again with 90, but Black secures with an extra move at 91. Insa must have been at his wit's end here. Black 91 aims not only at giving Black two eyes, but it is also big in terms of territory. Just imagine a white play at A.

Insa was floating about in a daze as he tried to stir up confusion with 92 and 94, but he would have done better calmly to play 93 instead of 92. Black would probably answer at B, and then White could play 92. The difference is that now Black can't jump into C but in the game he can. This is a very big difference, but actually it would have virtually no effect on the final outcome.

Black 95 and 97 are sente plays that show careful pre-



Dia. 29

paration for answering White 94. Black knows he is going to sacrifice three stones but if the three stones are captured first, Black 97 would no longer be sente. White's moves from 100 to 108 are natural in themselves but inasmuch as they are gote they bring no profit, because now Black can capture one stone at 103 and solidify his territory at the bottom.

Black 109 is very aggressive, although not necessarily dangerous. Dia. 29 is simpler. Black 1 and 3 are forcing moves then Black invades at 5. White might well resign there and then; he would be about 20 points behind.

I have a feeling that with Black 109 Jowa was just fooling around or was trying to rub his victory in.

There is a description of Honinbo Jowa as: "short and stout, with bushy eyebrows and a round, ample face, and with a quiet but indomitable gaze." It seems he was very self-confident, an attitude which, from the go point of view, is quite understandable, and there is a famous story about this. A member of his household asked him, "If there could be a match between the 4th Honinbo Dosaku and you, who would win?"




Fig. 13 (109-131)

Fig. 13 *The Restraining Hand of Heaven*

Whereupon Jowa is said to have replied, "If it was a match of 20 games, we would probably be *level* after the first ten games, but the last ten would be a walkover." There are differing opinions as to who he meant would win this walkover, but it is more than likely that Jowa said this in a tone of brashness rather than of modesty.

Once he had achieved appointment as Meijin through his intrigues, Jowa seems to have spent the latter half of his life in affluence, but his greatest joy was in finding his successor in Shuwa. After Jowa's retirement it was Shuwa who had to bear the brunt of Genan's challenge for the Meijin title, and by beating off this challenge Shuwa saved his teacher from possible embarrassment.

Now back to the game. White 18 is a do-or-die attempt to

capture the black group. After White 26 this group has only one eye, but the decisive factor for Black is that, after he comes out at 27, he has the cutting point at A.

Talking about Genan just now reminds me of a story. The only relevance here is that Genan was Insa's pupil, but it might serve to whet your appetite for the next game.

There are lots of stories about Genan. He had a completely pockmarked face but "he had such charm that children soon got used to this and grew to love him." Because of the way he looked he was often taken for a common gambler when he went travelling around the country, yet in fact he was one of the strongest of all go players. He was an expert in military strategy and enjoyed talking about politics, but there were aspects about him that made him seem eccentric in a lovable sort of way.

"I can go no further in Japan," he said one day. "I'm going to set up my own school and make my fortune in China, the cradle of go." Since travel abroad was strictly forbidden this was dangerous talk, but under the pretext of going on a boating trip he set out from Nagasaki in a little boat with one of his pupils, Mikami Gozan. They bided their time until an opportunity came to waylay the boatman and force him to set course for China. The frightened boatman thought that this was a lesser evil than arguing with two strong-looking men, and, steeling himself, he turned his boat round towards the China Sea. Then suddenly the wind got up and the waves tossed the little boat about until it was in imminent danger of being swamped. Not very long after they were right back where they started and Genan heaved a sigh. "Ah! Cruel Heaven will never let me go abroad. My skills are too precious to leave Japan." In fact, whatever Genan did he failed, but at least he earned the sympathy of later generations.





Fig. 14 (131-147)

Fig. 14 The End of the Game


If White answers Black 31 by cutting it off at A, Black will cut at 33, and since Black can then play B in sente he seems to have enough eye shape. White 32 and 34 are therefore inevitable.

Black 35 engenders just enough confusion for Black to live. If White 38 is at 1 in *Dia. 30*, Black is neatly sealed in, but Black lives easily with 2 to 10 while scooping out White's territory. White 38 stops this but it can't stop Black 41. The end is fast approaching.

If White 44 is at 1 in *Dia. 31*, Black 2 and 4 are forcing moves then Black's connection at 8 cannot be cut: White a, Black b, White c, Black d. Also, if White 5 in this sequence is played elsewhere, Black will hane there and the four white stones just to the right will be caught in an *oi-otoshi*.



Dia. 30



Dia. 31

If White 5 is at e, after the exchange of this for Black f if White cuts the connection at a, then Black 5, White g, Black h, White j, and now Black k is an *oi-otoshi*.

White resigned on seeing Black 47 because if White plays C, Black answers at D, and since Black E will be a telling move against the stones on the right (capturing some stones in an *oi-otoshi*), White has to defend somewhere here, which allows Black to play Black F, White G, Black H, which captures the five white stones.


White missed an early opportunity to settle his weakest group in this game, but the root cause of his defeat was really failing to take advantage of Black 49, which was virtually Black's only bad move in the game.

147 moves. White resigns.

RIVALS

It was Insa's successor, Rittetsu or, as he was later known, Genan, who was to become Jowa's greatest rival. Between 1812 and 1828 Genan and Jowa played each other 69 times. Jowa won 28 games, lost 34, drew 3 and four were left unfinished. Usually Genan had a handicap of some kind, such as taking Black in every game, taking Black two times out of three, or having two stones every third game, but he is also believed to have played some games on level terms, that is, alternating Black and White (there was no komi in those days, of course).

The game below was played in 1815. It is known as Rittetsu's masterpiece. Only 223 moves were recorded but Black did win by four points. Note how the fighting that started with Black 43 extended over the entire board.



Black: Hattori Rittetsu White: Honinbo Jowa
connects (●)

Game 7: THE IMPENETRABLE BARRIER

Played on 16th, 17th and 18th May, 1842

White: Inoue Genan Inseki

Black: Honinbo Shuwa

Shuwa (1820–1873) was the 14th head of the Honinbos. His real name was Tsuchiya and he was born in what is now Dohi. At the age of nine he was apprenticed to the Meijin Jowa and in 1840 became heir to Josaku, the 13th Honinbo. In that year he appeared in his first castle game. 1840 was also the year in which he first played Genan. Genan, you will recall, had his eyes on the post of Meijin vacated by Jowa the year before. He had formally challenged Shuwa to a match but Shuwa won by 4 points and the match was abandoned. That game is given afterwards. Two years later, although Genan had withdrawn his application for Meijin, he was encouraged by his supporters to challenge Shuwa to another match, but again the match was broken off after only one game. This is the game given here.

At the time Shuwa was 7-dan and Genan was 8-dan and so Shuwa, as the nominally weaker player, had to take a handicap. For one dan difference the handicap was to take Black in two games out of three (if there were two dans

difference the weaker player took Black all the time). Genan, however, even though he had a higher grade, was trying to clinch his application by showing that he could beat Shuwa even with White. Later in 1842 Genan and Shuwa met for the third time. Shuwa was Black again but won by 4 points (this game is given afterwards, too). With the game here, that meant Shuwa had won three times in a row as Black and Genan's failure to penetrate this barrier crushed his ambitions to become Meijin.

Not long after, Shuwa himself was promoted to 8-dan and in 1847 he became the 14th Honinbo. In 1859 he in turn submitted an application for appointment as Meijin, but it was a time of great political uncertainty and the Shogunate, in its twilight years, had other things on its mind. In 1868 the Shogun finally fell, the Emperor was restored to power and the hereditary stipends of the go families were revoked. Shuwa died in poverty in 1873. His life, like the rising and the setting of the sun, started in brilliant splendour and finished in darkness. From being a Meijin in all but name, he was reduced to a state where he couldn't even earn a crust of bread.

He achieved a rhythmic flow in his games that was like a fast-running river, never still and never going backwards. Many of today's professionals particularly admire his subtle use of amashi strategy when he had White. His pupils included Shusaku, Shuho, Nakagawa Kamesaburo (8-dan, 1837-1903) and Kishimoto Saichiro (7-dan, 1822-58) and the 15th, 16th and 17th Honinbos, Shuetsu, Shugen and Shuei, were all his own sons. It is no exaggeration to say that the go world of the late 19th century sprang from the House of Shuwa.




Fig. 1 (1-5)

Fig. 1 Genan's Resourcefulness

There is an impression that Genan, smarting from his defeat of two years before, came to this game with his strategy carefully planned in advance. We get this impression straightaway from the rather early approach move at White 2 and the equally early White 4. If White 4 is at A, of course Black plays the combined pincer and extension at B, and this makes Black 3 a perfect move.

Black answers positively at 5. This means that in this game now fight will follow fight and there will be no respite till the end. In such a game neither player can afford to put a foot wrong. At the time of this game, incidentally, Genan, the aggressor, was 44, Shuwa, the defender, was 22.





Fig. 2 (5-12)

Fig. 2 Imaginative Opening

Settling the situation with White 6 to Black 11 is, I think, what Genan was really after. In any case the taisha joseki with White 1 in *Dia. 1* doesn't work here. After Black 16 Black is nicely linked up to his corner stone $\triangle$ and White's five stones in the centre are floating around and going nowhere in particular. Black should have good prospects from attacking these stones. This is only one variation, of course, but other variations of the taisha also make the stone $\triangle$ effective. If $\triangle$ is at *a*, the relationship with 16 is not quite so perfect and in that case perhaps White could play the taisha.

Since he can't play the taisha joseki here, White plays the hane at 6. The result after Black 11 is somewhat disadvantageous to White. He achieves stability by occupying the



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

corner 3-3 point with move 10, but $\triangle$ is in a rather wishy-washy position. In fact it is effectively trying to cut a bamboo joint, so it is virtually a wasted move. If Black 9 is at 10, then White A, Black B, White 9 and Black is close to collapse. Black 11 is an important point. If Black leaves the joseki unfinished by omitting this move, White can attack immediately with 1 in *Dia. 2*. The stone $\triangle$ would then suddenly take on a new lease of life and Black's bamboo joint would be eyeless and heavy.

The high approach move at 12 is reasonable in itself, but it aims at a specific sequence in this game. It is perfectly possible for White to play at C instead. Black would extend to D and White can then take an empty corner with E. However, that sort of game would be a very close one with lots of small territories and Genan obviously rejected it because that is also the sort of game in which Shuwa excelled.

Instead, Genan chose to disregard any local disadvantage, preferring to emphasise speed with 12.




Fig. 3 (12-21)


Fig. 3 An Audacious Plan

After Black seals off the corner with 13 and 15, the common sense thing for White to do is to stabilise his group by extending to A. However, Genan has a bold, imaginative plan that becomes clear in White 18 after the forcing move of White 16.

Black 15 seems natural enough but it is not the only move.

Dia. 3 Nevertheless, in this case Black 1 and 3 are not so good. Even though Black 3 enables him to develop on the top edge at 5, this has little effect on the secure white group in the top right-hand corner where White already has nearly ten points of territory. Compared to this, White 4 and 6 seem to have abundant possibilities.

Although Black 17 looks too plain, it is another honest move.




Dia. 3

Dia. 4 Answering at 1 here would stir up a real hornets' nest, because White would reply with 2 and 4 rather than with *a*.

Normally, if White 16 is not at A it is at C or D, to aim at B. Instead, White 16 and 18 in the game not only do not follow up White 12

and 14, but they are even contradictory. In spite of this, though, White has conceived a powerful strategic idea, as the next figure will clearly show.

Black 19 and 21 are the best replies. If Black 19 is at 20, White can solidify his moyo with White E, Black F, White G.



Dia. 4




Fig. 4 (21-30)


Fig. 4 The Hostilities Open

The reason Black 21 is a good move is that, if White 22 is at 29, Black 28 neatly prevents White from connecting, and if White plays 1 in *Dia. 5*, after the forcing move at 2 Black can keep the two white stones in check with 4. After this diagram White's territory at the top is big, but it does no good just to give away two stones like this.


White leaves the upper left corner with 22 because he has no good moves there. Black 23 is now just the right move.

Dia. 6 Black 1 is thick but White can lightly dodge away at 2 and Black's efforts seem to have been wasted. Black 3 is an inevitable invasion but it brings confusion and the effect of having first move seems to have been lost.


Black 23 is threatening to capture the two white stones



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

on a large scale; White tries to rescue them, but plays in a roundabout way so as to get the best shape for his stones. Black 25 is a forcing move, then Black makes a base for himself with 27. Since this is also a weak point of White's stone at 22, it is really an ideal move. This is what makes Black 23 such a good move.

At first glance White 28 and 30 look reckless, inviting Black to cut him in two, but I think I would want to play this way. It builds up the moyo at the top to its full potential while assuming that the four white stones on the left can fend for themselves.

Dia. 7 The vague move of White 1 is completely guileless. In contrast Black 2 is brimming with power. Black has three separate but secure territories against White's one moyo, and the white stone ⊙ is floating without a base, so Black has nothing to worry about.





Fig. 5 (30-43)


Fig. 5 At a Stroke

White pushes at 30 and settles the situation at a stroke with the sequence up to 34, leaving himself just enough time to run away at 36. Presumably Genan was aiming at White 40 after this minor blitzkrieg. Black's replies need careful consideration because he can be cut by White A, Black B, White C, but White hasn't got time to do much about this at the moment and Black 43 is a satisfactory result. Even though White can wriggle out with 40 and 42, with 43 Black has a foot in the open space.

Consideration should be given to *Dia. 8*. If, instead of 30, White pushes through at 1 and presses at 3, Black has to connect at 4 and White can then make thickness with 5. At least this has the merit that Black cannot poke out as he does in the game at 43. Of course, if Black plays *a* now, White



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

gives way with *b*. Even so, this diagram seems a little insipid and it may be that Genan thought it was too slack.

In the game White gets compensation for letting Black poke out at 43 in that he has created a defect at D, from which he should be able to reap some profit. If Genan read all this out, we can only assume that his go style was very flexible.

Black has to accept the cutting point at D. If he mistakenly plays 1 in *Dia. 9* instead, White presses at 2 and Black's shape is virtually lifeless. After White *a*, Black *b*, White *c*, White has the choice of *d* or *e* to aim at.





Fig. 6 (43-52)

Fig. 6 Walking a Tightrope


To a certain extent White is being unreasonable in this fight, but Black cannot afford to make any mistakes. He is walking a tightrope with a long way to fall.

White makes a little stab at 44, threatening A, but withdraws his sword to cut at 46 instead. Apart from getting what he can out of this cut, White is also looking for two eyes for his group just above. Black's answer at 47 is unavoidable. If Black instead cuts at B, White will still descend to 48 and then the capture of two black stones with 49 or the capture of two stones in a ladder with 47 are pleasant alternatives for White.


What about White 48 at 1 in *Dia. 10*? Black's connection at 6 is the cool way to answer. He sacrifices two stones but his move at 8, which weakens White $\triangle$, is far bigger.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Dia. 11 Blocking at Black 6 also seems possible but White's capture at 7 and 9 is very big. It is true that Black should now capture the eight white stones above with 8 and 10, but White can stir up a lot of trouble with a cut at *a* later in the game. In addition, White *b* is quite a large move in sente, so Black can get hardly any profit here. *Dia. 10* is much better.

Black 49 is a natural reply to White 48. Black's two stones cannot now be captured. White 50 is also natural. If White 1 in *Dia. 12* instead, Black plays 2 and 4. Then if White defends at 5 and 7, Black 8 captures the white stones. If White 3 is at 5, again Black 6, White 7, Black 8, with the same result.

When Black cuts at 51, White defends against the ladder with 52—pure common sense, but still a good move.





Fig. 7 (52-63)

Fig. 7 The Fighting Spreads


White 52 is a good tesuji. If Black answers carelessly at 1 in *Dia. 13*, the game will be over in a flash with White 2 and 4. After White 10 Black loses by one move.

Black therefore plays the atari at 53. This gives him time to sort himself out with 55 and 57, imprisoning the five white stones. Black 55 at A to take the two white stones does not work because White B captures the three black stones first.

Black 57 is an awkward problem. If Black plays underneath instead at C, the five white stones clearly fall into his hands, whereas with the 57 of the game a cut remains at D. In fact White did exploit the potential of this cut later on. Nevertheless, the move chosen in the game is correct. The reason is that it is thicker towards the centre. The alternative at C, that is 1 in *Dia. 14*, leaves White the cut at *a*



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

and this causes problems for Black as shown. White 2 is a forcing move before defending the lower left corner with 4 and 6. White 12 could also be at *a*. White pushes up to 18 then blocks Black's exit with 20. Obviously Shuwa disliked this result and so chose Black 57.

White's five stones are virtually captured but White makes good shape with 58 and 60, and the variation here seems to signal success for Genan's blitzkrieg tactics. Black has made no ostensibly bad moves but the game seems to have turned somewhat sour for him.





Fig. 8 (63-71)

Fig. 8 *Composed Shuwa*


An unexpected trap awaited Genan in this figure and he put one foot into it before realising what he'd done. White 64 and 66 are the offending moves. White 64, probably played carelessly, unfortunately lets Black get the perfect and simple move at 65.

Dia. 15 White 1 is the vital point and presumably Genan overlooked this. After Black 2, White 3 and 5 make good shape while forcing Black to defend his cutting point with 6, and then White puts the pressure on with 7 to 11. Close-quarter fighting will follow and this is clearly better for White than the sequence in the game. If Black 2 is at *a*, then White *b*, Black 3, White *c* and Black's six stones are still on the defensive.

White 66 surrounds a large area but it seems rather ex-



Dia. 15



② elsewhere
Dia. 16

travagant. No doubt Genan made this move in a somewhat unclear frame of mind, having just been appalled at his own absentmindedness in letting Black off the hook. White 66 at A now has no effect on Black. Instead it is Black who is doing the chasing with 67, at least for a bit before making the necessary defensive move at 69.

White 66 at 1 in *Dia. 16* was the right move. If Black ignores this he loses through White 3 to 9, but if he answers at 5, White then plays *a* and builds up thickness for the lower edge.

White 70 at B is solid and reliable but has little effect on Black. Black could then occupy the empty corner with C and the remainder of the game would be easy for him.

Black 71 defends against White A.





Fig. 9 (71-78)

Fig. 9 A Second Front


Black 71 is thick but White 72 opens up a second front. White 74 in particular is a severe move.

Dia 17 The plain White 1 here, instead of 74, is a complete waste of time. Although Black's position after 6 is low, he is safe and White 1 and 5 are bad shape. White 74 hopes for Black 75 at 1 in *Dia. 18* and this result is very different from that of *Dia. 17*. In *Dia. 17* White 1 is totally lacking in direction, whereas its equivalent in *Dia. 18*, White 4, is developing outwards in good shape.


What about White 1 in *Dia. 19* in place of his 74? After White 7 the result is similar to *Dia. 18*, but in fact Black would answer White 1 as in *Dia. 20* with the atari and connection of 2 and 4. This gives Black thickness in the centre and weakens White's group on the left, not a welcome



Dia. 17



Dia. 18




6 fills
Dia. 19


prospect for White.

Dia. 21 If White answers Black 2 with the atari at 3, Black can answer at *a*, which would lead to the same result as in the game, but Black can also connect at 4. The loss of the five black stones in the corner after Black 10 is unexpectedly small (Black *b* is his privilege) and the white stones in the centre are made very weak.

The thrust and parry of White 74 and Black 75 is therefore inevitable and so a ko arises with White 78.



Dia. 20



Dia. 21




Fig. 10 (78-87)


Fig. 10 Ko Tactics

The ko at 78 in fact marks the decisive point in this game. The purpose behind Black 79 to 87 is not just to limit White's territory, but also to prepare material for the ko fight.

Going back a little bit, White 78 at 1 in *Dia. 22* captures Black's five stones, but after the forcing moves Black 2 to 6, Black takes the lead in the fight in the centre with 8 and 10 and his prospects seem better than White's. White's nine stones are actually on the verge of death and, in addition, Black *a* to White *f* remains as a sente endgame sequence.

Replacing Black 79 by the connection at A is foolish, as will be obvious if you compare this to *Dia. 22* and consider that cutting off and capturing White 78 would then be gote, whereas Black *a* in the diagram is sente.

Black 79 is a tesuji to be proud of, and White 80 and 82







Fig. 11 (87-101)

Fig. 11 Big Ko

Black 87 and so on are still preparing for the ko fight to come. White has chosen to fall back and his territory at the top has been whittled down to a shadow of its former glory. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to give way up to White 96. Black then interposes the forcing move at 97 since it may prove useful and finally starts the ko in earnest with 99. Even though Genan held back in an effort to cut down Black's ko material, Black still has plenty of threats, starting with 101. Perhaps he regretted not playing White 87.

As for the ko itself, neither player can really afford to lose it. If, for instance, White falls back again at 1 and 3 in *Dia.* 24, Black can cut after wedging in at 4 and the position is fraught with danger for White. White 5 and 7 may well capture the black group above, but the white stones below

8 and 10 are on the point of extinction and Black can reduce his loss through the sente sequence Black *a* to White *f*. In fact, unless White is very careful, there is even a danger that his group on the right could be captured itself. Although the territory balances out quite evenly here, Black's overall superior thickness cannot be ignored.




Dia. 24

It is said that Shuwa was a man of modesty and virtue but very little refinement. One of his habits was satirised in a comic poem of the time. This loses its effect in translation but runs something like:

See dancing through the forest
As noontime comes around,
Satsuma Ken and Yuzo
With Hatto at their head.
But that devil Onizuka
Is left behind at home,
Forever at the bottle,
While Shuwa's still abed!


Several go players are mentioned here. Satsuma Ken was a pupil of the 12th Hayashi, Hakuei. Hayashi means forest, incidentally. Ota Yuzo apparently excelled in the slow, stately dancing of the kabuki theatre, and Hatto refers to Hattori Seitetsu (7-dan, 1819-1860). Onizuka Genji (6-dan, died 1856) was notorious for his addiction to *sake*, while Shuwa was equally notorious as a late riser.



⑥, ⑨, ⑫, ⑮, ⑳ take ko
 ㉒ connects at ㉑
 ㉓ takes ko
 Fig. 12 (101-125)

Fig. 12 *Sacrificing the Left Side*

Black's answer to White 16, namely the cut at 17 and the wedging move at 19, are both worthy of note. If Black does not play 17, he can be captured unconditionally by White A. If Black 19 is at 1 in *Dia. 25*, Black can save his own stones and capture White's, but Black anticipates winning the ko on the right anyway, and he intends to sacrifice the left side with this in mind. Grabbing the weak point at 19 and thus spoiling White's shape is a preliminary measure. Remember that although White gets an extra move on the left side, he still needs two more moves to capture Black.




㉔, ㉖, ㉘, ㉚, ㉜ take ko
 Fig. 13 (125-149)

Fig. 13 *The Ko is Settled*

The surrender at White 42 is unfortunate but seems unavoidable. The result after Black captures at 43 is that Black now has greater thickness but there is still a ko on the left which at the moment stands in White's favour. Overall the prospects seem to be slightly better for Black.

Black 47 occupies a good point but the next move, White 48, is quite incomprehensible to me. There seems no reason not to put the white group in order as in *Dia. 26*.



Dia. 26




Fig. 14 (149-158)


Fig. 14 A Large Moyo Appears

Black has been allowed to increase his thickness on the lower edge with 49 and this is painful for White.

Black 51 at 56 would set off a vicious attack against White's weak group, but if this group lives, it will have devastated Black's moyo at the bottom in the process. Black 51 and 53 instead occupy important points while maintaining the threat of attacking White later.


If Black 51 goes right into the corner at 1 in *Dia. 27*, White pincers him at 2 and seals him in. After White extends to 8 it is not clear where Black can play next.

White 54 implies that Black is 90% captured. The huge



Dia. 27

moyo at the bottom is nearing completion and it seems urgent to break it up while this is still possible, with 1 in *Dia. 28*. If now Black plays *a*, White *b* forces Black *c*, and then White achieves his goal by extending to *d*. Black would, however, be more likely to attack abruptly at 2, although the white group should be in no danger thanks to the help given by the stone $\triangle$. Nevertheless, with this group in such a delicate condition Black *e* will be decisive. White would not be too happy about his "orphan" at 1 either. All things considered, White would be courting disaster and so Genan prudently opted for White 54. Black promptly denies White the chance to spoil his moyo, as in *Dia. 28*, by playing 55. White again tidies up his loose ends with 56, and again Black expands his moyo with 57. Black 57 at A would be too much of a half-measure. The game now hinges on what becomes of this moyo and White 58, slap bang on the vital point, maintains the suspense.



Dia. 28





Fig. 15 (158-163)

Fig. 15 The Third Decisive Point

The game builds up to a climax with the attack on White 58. After long deliberation Shuwa correctly chose Black 59 as his answer. If he plays on the other side, at 1 in *Dia. 29*, White can live up to 8. There is no doubt that White is going to be able to live on the lower edge anyway, but Black must, as far as possible, ensure that White lives in a way advantageous to him.

Dia. 30 Black could naturally try to turn his moyo into territory with Black 3, letting White connect at 2. However, this means accepting a loss in the corner, with Δ becoming a wasted stone, and White can still invade after Black 5 with White A, Black B, White C in the figure.

White 62 is the vital point now. If it is at 1 in *Dia. 31* instead, Black 4 reduces his breathing space and the result-




Dia. 29

Dia. 30

ing ko is not much use to White. The skilful way to secure life in such circumstances is to dodge around, leaving yourself with the choice of White D or White E until you see how things develop.

Black 63 is the right reply. It means that even if White does live on the lower edge, Black will form territory in the corner.

Dia. 32 If Black blocks at 1, White 2 is a tesuji and White will live easily, devastating Black's moyo on the way. If Black 3 is at *a*, White can again make a live shape easily by playing *b*.



Dia. 31

Dia. 32





Fig. 16 (163-165)

Fig. 16 The Honest Move

Notice that it is not good for White to try to trade territories if Black should play his 63 at 1 in *Dia. 33* (i.e. the same 1 as in *Dia. 32*). When White slips into the corner at 2, Black can solidify himself with 5 and 7. After White is restricted to the corner, Black 11 is a cool move—and big. White has to get rid of the ko with 20, interposing 18 first. This gives Black sente to take the last big endgame point with 21 and 23. If play proceeded as in this diagram, Black would win by about 4 points.

White 64 is the right way to ensure life, being light and flexible. A play at A instead would be too heavy and living would probably prove impossible.

Black's next move, 65, has long been famous as the classic specimen of an honest move. This one move eliminates



Dia. 33

both of White's forcing moves B and C before anything can come of them. White had been relying on them in his efforts to make a viable group, but now his living space has been narrowed right down. Shuwa presumably read out that White will live, but it is life of a very restricted kind, as the next figure will show.

Shuwa's games are full of moves such as Black 65. There is a feeling about his style that conveys solid reliability with both feet firmly planted on the ground, dwelling in the reality of here and now. This contrasts sharply with Genan's soaring imagination. In his later years, however, Shuwa had White a lot and he changed his style, tending to play more risky amashi go, backed up of course by a profound tactical awareness.




Fig. 17 (165-174)


Fig. 17 White Lives

Black 65 gets rid of all the nasty bits and pieces. Black 1 in *Dia. 34* in place of this is more aggressive. White has to answer Black 5 with the ko shape at 6, but this ko is very welcome to White. When the ko starts after White 14, White has an abundance of internal threats, which is tantamount to his being unconditionally alive. It is difficult to say whether this is better or worse than the result in the game. Shuwa apparently thought *Dia. 34* was worse.


The pole connection at 1 in *Dia. 35* can also be considered. If play proceeds as shown, we would simply revert to *Dia. 34*.

If Black 3 of *Dia. 34* is replaced by 3 in *Dia. 36*, White lives easily with 4.

White 66 is the typical tesuji for this kind of position.




Dia. 34



Dia. 35

If Black 69 is the cut at A instead, White starts a ko with 70. Black would be inviting trouble if he played like that. Shuwa (Black) had probably worked out that he would win if he simply let White live, even though the result would be close, and so he had no reason to fight a ko.

The additional profit from moves such as Black 71 is Black's reward for letting White live only in the way most favourable to Black.



Dia. 36




Fig. 18 (174-188)


Dia. 37

Fig. 18 Skilful

Black takes more profit with 77 to 81 and has sente to take the big point at 83. In other words, White has lived on the lower side, but in return Black has secured the right-hand side.

White 86 is skilful. White wants to remove the ko at A, even though it is a multi-step, or yose, ko in his favour, but he sees how Black will answer 86 first. After Black 87 White settles the ko with 88 and then the connection at B remains as possible additional profit for him.

Dia. 37 If Black 87 had been at 1 here, settling the ko becomes less urgent for White and so he can turn to another big point. The ko is less urgent because to win it Black has to fill the liberty at *a*, but he cannot do this until he has used an extra move to prevent White's cut at *b*.




⑩⑩, ⑩⑩, ⑩⑩ take ko
Fig. 19 (188-218)

Fig. 19 Close Game

The game is very close. Black 91 and 95 take the last big point and then White 96 starts a ko. Black 101 is a lovely answer. It is aiming at a double ko with Black A.

Dia. 38 Black 1 allows White a forcing move at 4 and so is a loss. Black 99 is a thick move and it threatens the cut at B, which is what White 112 is defending against.

Black 113 and 115 and White 116 and 118 are interchangeable alternatives. Strictly speaking, the rest of the game should be normal small endgame plays, but Genan had other ideas.



Dia. 38




Fig. 20 (218-245)


Fig. 20 Five Points Thrown Away

The game continued with small endgame plays, Black 23 and 25 and White 30 being quite large, but the remaining moves were all worth 2 or 3 points. Then suddenly Genan released White 36. All at once the game hung on whether or not this move worked.

To state the conclusion first, it does not work. After Black 45 White cannot live in the corner. Moreover, White has incurred a loss of 5 points through this.

The usual endgame plays would be to exchange $\triangle$ for $\blacktriangle$ in Dia. 39. In the area below XXX Black has 18 points of territory. In the actual game he got 23 points, a difference of 5 points. And in the end White lost by 6 points.

In fact the difference was slightly more than 5 points. In Dia. 39 White has a $\frac{1}{2}$ -point (i.e. a potential 1-point)




at *a*, so the game might have ended in a draw or a Black win by one point. It might seem, therefore, that White 36 was a regrettable oversight by Genan, but as it happens he would have lost by one point anyway. Before explaining that, though, let us look at this position more closely. First of all, if Black 37 is at 42, White obviously plays 37 and Black has given the game away.

Dia. 40 This Black 1 leads to Black 13. Later Black will capture two stones at $\triangle$ and White will take one stone back. White has already captured $\triangle$, so this all cancels out and Black's territory in the corner is 16 points. There is two points difference with Dia. 39 and White would thus win the game by 1 point. In this sequence, if Black 11 connects at 12 instead, Black loses even more: White *a*, Black 13, White *b*.


Black 37 is therefore the best move, but White 38 poses a very difficult problem.

Dia. 41 If White plays 1 in place of his 38, Black 2 and 4 are the skilful moves that make the futility of $\triangle$ quite clear.


After White 38 and 42, the only way for Black to kill the white group is keep his distance with 43.



Dia. 42



Dia. 43



Dia. 44

If Black 43 is at 1 in *Dia. 42*, the atari at White 4 is, in effect, a forcing move and the best Black can do is to allow White a ko with White 6. It goes without saying that Black must lose this way.


Dia. 43 If Black answers White 4 directly at 5, White 6 is the vital point and he is unconditionally alive.

Dia. 44 On the other hand, if White descends to 4, he is unequivocally dead. Black 5 is the same vital point.


Dia. 45 This White 4 also produces ko. White 8 at *a*, followed by Black 9, White *b*, Black 8, is another ko.

Dia. 46 It is mistake to think that White 6 gives a ko as shown. In fact Black would play his 7 at 8 and White dies.


Dia. 47 This Black 1? White lives unconditionally after 14.




Dia. 45




Dia. 46




13 fills
Dia. 47



Dia. 48



Dia. 49




Dia. 50


Dia. 48 Another Black 1. White 4 is still the vital point and he is alive. Black 3 at *a* transposes back to *Dia. 42*.

That leaves only Black 43 and 45 of the actual game. White's only answer could be 1 in *Dia. 49* and then Black has to be careful not to cut at 2, otherwise he will lose. He has to play 2 and 4 in *Dia. 50*, but there are more traps Black could fall into. Black 8 is one of them. This is ko. Black 10 at 7 instead lets White live by capturing at *a*. *Dia. 51* shows what follows.


Dia. 52 Black has to be more skilful and play 2. White 3 is the only likely looking move but the end comes in *Dia. 53*, where White cannot play at *a* because his former liberty at $\triangle$ has been filled in. White has no other ways in which he might live.



Dia. 51



5 takes 2 stones
6 takes back
Dia. 52



Dia. 53




Fig. 21 *Poor Genan*

The negotiations in the lower right corner were the last element of confusion. From now on it is all straightforward. White wins the $\frac{1}{2}$ -point ko at the end because he has so many ko threats in the bottom right-hand corner and so the throw-in at 64 is successful in making Black fill in at 69.

People have wondered why Genan played 36. Two cases might be considered.

1. With normal play the game was going to end in a draw. In that case Genan must have made a mistake in his reading of the situation in the lower right corner.
2. With normal play Black was going to win by 1 point. We could perhaps assume in that case that Genan was hoping for a swindle.



In actual fact the result with normal play would be a victory for Black by 1 point. *Dia. 54* shows how. The difference between this diagram and the game is, first of all, in the lower right corner, where Black's territory has been reduced by 5 points. Apart from that it is virtually the same, but in the game Black played 63 and so White could play at 64, winning the $\frac{1}{2}$ -point ko. In *Dia. 54* White doesn't have to bother with this since he gets a point at *a*. Black gets an extra point at *b* to cancel this out. White could play at 24 and force Black to fill at *b*, but then White could not win the $\frac{1}{2}$ -point ko and take the point at *a* at the same time. In short, the only real difference is in the 5 points in the lower right corner. Subtracting this from the final result, we can see that Black was going to win by 1 point anyway.


270 moves. *Black wins by 6 points.*

THE FIRST GAME

Fig. A shows the first game between Genan and Shuwa. It was played in November 1840 and was also the first game of what was supposed to be a 20-game match. It took nine days to complete.

Black's strategy seems to have been one of containment, concentrating on areas where White could not really do anything. Genan got very frustrated by Shuwa's go style. I can't help feeling that Shuwa's precision had a damping effect on Genan's skill.


264 moves. Black wins by 4 points.



Black : Honinbo Shuwa; White : Genan Inseki
Fig. A

The second game between Genan and Shuwa was the one explained in detail above. The third and last game was the one in *Fig. B*. It was played in the Shogun's Palace in 1842 and after losing this game Genan resigned himself to never becoming Meijin.

Play over the game in *Fig. B* and I think, like me, you will detect a certain lack of ambition on Shuwa's part. This is a very arguable point because it may just be the result of a clash of completely opposite styles: Genan's brilliance against the classical style of go, epitomised by Shuwa, in which there was a strong emphasis on making groups secure as early as possible. Even so, in both *Fig. A* and *Fig. B* I seem to hear a murmur from every black stone that is played,



Black : Honinbo Shuwa; White : Genan Inseki
Fig. B

261 moves. Black wins by 4 points.

a murmur that says, "This is just enough" or "This will win by x points."

Shuwa was the top man in the go world of the middle of the last century. Once he had overcome Genan, his only real rivals were the Tempo Four Best. Tempo was the name of the era that ran from 1830 to 1844 and the Four Best, who earned this name for their good looks as much as their go skill, were Ito Showa, Yasui Sanchi, Ota Yuzo and Sakaguchi Sentoku. Although for a time Shuwa played these four on even terms, he generally gave them a handicap.

Shuwa found Yasui Sanchi the hardest to beat. Apparently Ota Yuzo was his easiest opponent. Sanchi's go style, which bore no resemblance to his father, Senkaku's, was all power and he would try to wipe Shuwa off the board altogether. Unfortunately for him, his fuseki was rather poor and Shuwa would soon get a lead. Then from the middle game and right through the endgame it was a case of attack, attack, attack by Sanchi. If Shuwa survived the attacks he won easily. Sanchi used to complain, "Shuwa can't see anything, you know. If I play somewhere he just runs away". But Shuwa's attitude was, "Why should I be daft enough to take the full force of all that power?" Shuwa's preeminence over the Tempo Four is perhaps best explained by his own comment: "My own style is not so different from anybody else's. The only real difference is that I'm a bit better in the fuseki."

Game 8:

THE AUTUMN LEAVES WERE FALLING

Played on 22nd October 1851 in the house of Abe Jinzaburo

White: Honinbo Shuwa

Black: Honinbo Shusaku

Honinbo Shusaku (1829–1862) was the heir to the 14th Honinbo, Shuwa. Born in what is now Hiroshima Prefecture, his real name was Kuwahara Torajiro. At the age of eight he was already able to play Ito Showa in a 9-stone game at Onomichi. At nine he came up to the capital to become a pupil of Honinbo Jowa. By 1840 he was shodan and by 1846 4-dan. In that year he played Genan Inseki in Osaka, scoring three wins and leaving one game unfinished. Genan was amazed at the boy's strength. 1848 was an eventful year. He was appointed Shuwa's heir, was promoted to 6-dan, and married Jowa's daughter, Hana. In the following year he made his first appearance at the Shogun's Palace. In the 13-year period up to 1861 he played 19 castle games and won the lot. He died of cholera at the early age of 34 in the Edo (Tokyo) home of the Honinbos, without actually succeeding to the title of head of the family. Nevertheless, he is still honoured as a Honinbo.

Shusaku was only 7-dan when he died, yet he is regarded as a “go sage”, a title accorded only to the very greatest go players. His go style was characterised by deep, sharp reading and a constant forward momentum. His expertise in assessing prospects evidenced itself in his style. If he got an early lead he would nurture it carefully to the end, but if he fell behind he could display a brutish force in an effort to turn the tables. He was a superman on the go board and Jowa often enjoyed comparing him to Dosaku, who had died a century and a half before, saying, “When Shusaku is around I can feel a breath of wind in my house from 150 years ago.”

Teacher-pupil games between Shuwa and Shusaku started in 1843 with Shusaku taking two stones. They continued until 1851 and 27 of these games remain, this being one of them. In the two games played at two stones Shusaku scored one win and one loss. In the other 25 games Shusaku had Black (there were no games with Shuwa taking Black) and he won 17 and lost 5. There were 2 draws and one unfinished game. Judging by these games, though, we cannot say with certainty that Shusaku was stronger than Shuwa. What stands out is Shuwa’s masterly use of amashi strategy, the way he made games close and the way he skilfully ground down Shusaku’s advantage of having first move. Naturally enough, however, these teacher-pupil games were not blood-thirsty affairs. The feeling they inspire is one of floating carefree like the autumn leaves that must have been falling in the garden as this game was played.




Fig. 1 (1-8)

Fig. 1 Shusaku's Opening

Black 1, 3 and 5 are known to the world as Shusaku's opening. Shusaku used it frequently and systematically, regarding it as an opening that retained the advantage of having first move. It has been said many times before, but the diagonal move at 7 is the kind of play made when your attitude is that you are going to win, even if it's only by 3 points. Nowadays, because of komi, Black would tend to play a more severe move such as the pincer at A, but that's not the same as saying you will win by a large margin if you play A and a small margin if you play 7.

White 8 is an idiosyncratic move. More natural would be White C or D, so as to prevent Black B, which combines a pincer with an extension.





Fig. 2 (8-26)



Dia. 3 The joseki with Black 1 lets White erase the black moyo in good shape at 8 and the scene is already set for a close game, that is, a game with lots of small fights and no big moyos. Black's pincer at *a* is now only a local move.


Incidentally, Black 1 in *Dia. 3* was first played by Shuwa.

Fig. 2 Natural Flow

Once White approaches at 8, Black 11 is obviously the important point, but the joseki of the day was to play the forcing move at Black 9 first. From the pedantic modern point of view White is giving too much away.

White 12 is where I would play but it still feels like an uphill struggle for White. White 1 in *Dia. 1*, however, is far too clumsy. Since the stone $\triangle$ is backed up by strength in the lower left corner, it means that White is playing wastefully.

Dia. 2 In local terms switching over to 1 and 3 is good play, but in this case it is no good. The position White 1 and 3 form with $\triangle$ is too flat to be attractive. Hence White 12, but Black 21 and 23 are well chosen.



Dia. 3




Fig. 3 (26-38)


Fig. 3 Arduous Fight

The fighting is undeniably difficult for White, because it is taking place inside Black's sphere of influence, but White has to take time off to press at 28, otherwise he will have no prospects worth speaking of.


Dia. 4 In other words, if he plays 1 and 3 to ensure his safety in the centre, Black gets a thick territory along the lower edge with 2 and 4. This is unbearable for White.

White 30 is good shape. Black 29 had been expected, but answering with White 1 in *Dia. 5* seems to leave White too thin in the centre, while the two-stone group on the edge is heavy and thus a prime target for attack.

Black 33 is a forcing move and it helps him to make good shape with 35 and 37. These last two moves start to build up a moyo on the left side while aiming at A. This is a good




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

way to play. If Black rushes to cut at 1 in *Dia. 6*, White will connect at 2. Black 3 is forced and when White presses at 4, Black's moyo is very small and the white group in the corner now has nothing to worry about. However, Black 35 could be at 1 in *Dia. 7*. White 2 is regrettable but necessary, yet it means that the moyo on the left becomes ominously large. The thing to remember is that even though the corner is threatened with a ko after Black 35 and 37, there is the danger that White might skilfully adapt the circumstances so that he can sacrifice the corner.

The possible effectiveness of a ko with Black B instead of 33, followed by White C, Black 34, is too hypothetical to be worth considering.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7





Fig. 4 (38-50)

Fig. 4 Invading the Moyo


What about White 38? It was probably played instinctively, but I would prefer White 1 in *Dia. 8*. I like vague moves such as this. It aims at the moyo-erasing moves *a* or *b* next and gives the game a nice, gentle pace. After Black 43 White can still erase the moyo at 44 but now things have hotted up.

Black 39 is quite straightforward but a word for beginners. Cutting at 1 in *Dia. 9* so that you can grab territory with 3 to 7 is very bad. Black 1 is left high and dry and White gets perfect thickness up to 8.


If Black rushes to solidify himself by playing 45 and 47 before 43, White will be allowed to occupy the good point 43 himself. After Black 43, even if White captures the two black stones at the top, this is still better for Black



Dia. 8




Dia. 10



Dia. 9

than simply letting White connect at 39. If White had been able to connect at 39, both A and B would have remained as severe threats. In *Dia. 10*, however, Black can now play 2 and 4 to capture three white stones. And there is still a ko in the corner. In short this is no good for White. He therefore counters with an erasing move at 44, but then Black can return to 45 and 47. White still needs a move in the corner but he keeps things on the boil by laying waste to Black's moyo with 48 and 50.




64 takes ko at 66
Fig. 5 (50-66)

Fig. 5 A Big Change


Black 1 in *Dia. 11* instead of his 51 has no real meaning. White 2 forces Black 3, then White lives with 4. In effect Black has thus incurred a loss. White can happily treat his three stones $\triangle$ lightly and be prepared to sacrifice them. Black 51 is therefore a more severe way of playing. After Black 55 the corner has become ko, but White ignores this and plays the excellent move 56 with his eye on the centre. We are seeing a method of coping with a ticklish situation that is typical of Shuwa. After White 58 to 62 the white group in the corner still hasn't been captured. A ko remains, and since this is dangerous for Black he rushes to settle it with 63 and 65. This allows White to get 66, so the result of this battle is even. It seems, in fact, that White has ex-

tricated himself rather well from a difficult situation. Black has a territory of about 40 points in the top left corner, but he has used three extra moves to get it: Black 55, 63 and 65, and meanwhile White has built up a moyo of great potential in the centre. Overall White has no need to be dissatisfied.



Dia. 11

White 1 in *Dia. 12*, in place of White 64, is too small-minded. He only has ko threats in the top right-hand corner, but Black can easily sacrifice $\triangle$, win the ko and turn to 6. White's centre moyo disappears in a puff of smoke. As if that wasn't enough, White would also have to worry about the threat of Black *a*.



Dia. 12 4 fills




Fig. 6 (66-74)

Fig. 6 Building up the Moyo

66 gives White a reasonable game but Black 67 is a big move. If the position had remained otherwise the same and White had played the atari at A, followed by Black 67, White B, it would be ideal for White. This is why Black took at 67, and he is also aiming at C.


Dia. 13 The double hane of Black 1 and 3 seems just to give secure territory to White on the lower edge.

Black 71 was a good reply to White 70 and must have been disappointing for White.


Dia. 14 If White comes right up to 1 here, Black will sacrifice the top right-hand corner and take a strong territory orientated base on the side with 2 and 4. This leads to an easy game for Black. Holding back one line at 1 in *Dia. 15* is not so good for White either. White 3 and 5 are a strong

attacking posture but Black 6 is bound to be annoying and White's position on the right is too wide to be called a moyo. Although Black 71 is good, White 72 and 74 look natural. My feeling is that if White checks at D instead, Black E erases the centre and if White then surrounds territory with F, Black plays somewhere around G and White cannot win.


The scale of a territory walled off on the F line is too small for this game and White would clearly be behind.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15





Fig. 7 (74-80)

Fig. 7 One Line Difference

Black 75 is spot on. Just one line difference would cause problems. For instance, Black 1 in *Dia. 16* is one line higher, but White caps it and after White's attack from 4 to 8, Black is being hard pressed. White could also play from below, with 2 at 3, and then Black *a*, White *b*, but I prefer the cap at 2.

Dia. 17 Black 1 is one line lower and White 2 is obvious. Black's play has no merit apart from living with 3 to 11; White seals him in with 8 and 10 and has sente to turn to A (in the figure) on the right-hand side. Black would lose.


Black 75 and 77, with the promise of a base and a stake in the centre, are therefore the best plays. White 78 is now an important point. Attacking from the other side at 1 in *Dia. 18* drives Black into White's own moyo with 4 and 6,




Dia. 16

inviting Black in other words to plunder his treasure store.

Incidentally, a lot is going to depend on who gets to A (or B for Black) first. This is because of the wall created by White 76 and 78.



Dia. 17



Dia. 18





Fig. 8 (80-90)

Fig. 8 *Fighting for Sente*


White 80 and 82 stop Black advancing to the centre, and he wants, if possible, to get sente to go to A before Black. Black 81 at 1 in *Dia. 19* is no good. White 2 and 4 scoop away his base, 6 and 8 seal him in and Black will be hard put to live here. If Black 3 is at 4, White 3 puts the black group in jeopardy, and if Black 7 is at 8, then White plays *a*. Black 83 is a probing move and it is a skilful reply to White 82. The next figure will show why.

If White's hane underneath at 86 (hane on top at 90 is not so good by the way) is answered by Black 1 in *Dia. 20*, White has the strong move at 2. The sequence up to Black 19 is then inevitable, but White 20 is severe. Black cannot afford to suffer this move.




Dia. 19

Dia. 21 This Black 13 takes two white stones, but White squeezes him nicely up to 20 and White 22 captures five black stones. Hence Black 87, and now White has to play both 88 and 90, however much he might want to play elsewhere, because of the danger of a cut by Black at B.



Dia. 20



Dia. 21





Fig. 9 (90-101)


Fig. 9 Black Leads

Since White 90 was necessary, Black gets the pending point on the right side. It may sound odd, as we normally use the phrase with reference to the opening or the endgame, but Black 91 is the "last big point" of the middle game. It seems to ensure Black a good 5-point lead.

However, White 92 is a thick move. It compensates somewhat for Black 91 by getting thickness that will exert influence on the lower edge. Black then pushes through at 93 and the effect of $\triangle$ becomes clear. To go back a bit, if White answers Black's peep 1 with a connection at 2 in *Dia. 22*, Black would probably seek safety with 3, the exchange of 1 and 2 having then become pure profit, and the threat of a black play at *a* remains. Even with White's answer in the



Dia. 22



Dia. 23

game, Black 93 achieves the effect of nibbling at White's territory.

White 94 to 98 are the optimum plays. White is trying, by attacking Black, to settle the situation here and collect points in the centre. Black can live alright, but White wants to make sure that he does so in a way that leaves him with no chance of intruding into the white moyo. After White 100 there is a slight problem about Black B after Black A, but to all intents and purposes Black is sealed in. Black 101 is a cool move. Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 23* instead would be a mistake. White 4 and 6 attack Black's vital points and the whole aspect of the game would suddenly change.

Black's territory is a little over 40 points in the upper left area of the board, a little over 10 points in the lower left, about 4 points on the lower edge, and a little over 10 points on the top right-hand side, a total of around 70 points of secure territory. On the other hand, White has 25 points (assuming C to be his privilege) in the bottom right. So the game depends on whether White will get about 45 points in the centre. However, both these players were masters at calculating the final result from such positions, and I should imagine they both knew that at this stage Black was about 5 points ahead.




Fig. 10 (101-122)


Fig. 10 *Sente and Gote*

Black is clearly alive on the lower edge with 1; he has a connection at 16 if need be.

White's defensive move at 2 will be necessary sooner or later, because after Black A there is a threat at B.

Black 3 and 5 quickly grab big points, but they make the White moyo in the centre even more imposing and the game seems very close.


Black answers White 6 and 8 with the forcing move at 9 and the extension on the side at 11, even though from the standpoint of defending the corner territory Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 24* are preferable. The problem is, however, that his group on the right will die. The hane at 6 and White's last move 14 in the diagram are good moves, otherwise it is quite straightforward.



Dia. 24


White, for his part, would like to defend his corner territory with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 25*, instead of peeping at 12, but then Black gets into the centre with 4. White 12 guarantees the territory in the centre.

White's capture at 14 is unexpectedly large. The black group at the bottom has to live as best it can, but Black 17 after the forcing move at 15 is skilful. After Black 21, White cannot omit 22 and Black lives in sente. *Dia. 26* shows how White will collapse if he does omit 22.



Dia. 25

Dia. 26




29 takes ko
Fig. 11 (122-141)

Fig. 11 The Last Fight

Although 22 is gote, White has captured two stones with 14, he is now thick in the centre and A remains as a sente play for him, so he has no reason to be dissatisfied. In other words, the negotiations on the lower edge can be regarded as satisfactory for both players. White 24 also seems unavoidable to defend the centre against Black 25, White 30, Black B.


After Black 25 White has to give way and connect at 30, and then Black 31 is a good move typical of the imaginative Shusaku. If White 32 is the straightforward 1 in *Dia. 27*, Black, after 2, can play 4. The rest is easy and as Black solidifies himself up to 12, the likelihood of his victory is obvious. He can even aim at *a* as well. White 32 and 34 of the game are




Dia. 27

better, anyway, from the point of view of territory, and when Black tries to encroach at 35, White 36 is a good move. It aims at catching the black stone 35 in a splitting attack. Answering at 1 in *Dia. 28* secures profit, but after White 4 Black is in some danger. Moreover, the good shape of White 4 is disappointing for Black. Consequently Black played 37 and this seems right to me. Because it is such a vital point, I would want to play here even if it were only a local move. However, allowing White the compensation of nibbling away at Black's territory with 38 is then a necessary evil.

If Black 41 is at 1 in *Dia. 29*, White will first secure profit with 2 and then dodge into the corner to get compensation there.



Dia. 28



Dia. 29




Fig. 12 (141-160)

Fig. 12 *The Fight Ends*

A minor fight continues, but it all looks inevitable up to Black 55 anyway. Black 43 is a tesuji answer to White 42 and then White 44 is a probing move. If White 44 is at 45 to surround more territory, Black's slide at A is very big. The move played forces an answer here and White defends his territory only after Black 45. Black 51 and 53 are big but they give White sente, which is the whole point of White's play. It is worth sitting back and savouring the subtleties of the order of the moves here.

So White has sente now and obviously, after exercising his right to 56 and 58, he takes the last big endgame point at 60. The difference between White 60 and Black A is as much as 20 points. Actually, although both players probably did their best, the sequences around here are full of subtle pros and cons.




Fig. 13 (160-180)


Fig. 13 *The Real Endgame Starts*

I don't want it to appear that I am shirking my duty, but a huge number of endgame sequences could have been considered in the space of the last 20 moves and it would be quite impossible to go through them one by one. The endgame is not one of my strong points anyway. You need somebody like Ishida for that.

If White 64 is omitted, Black can play Black A, White 64, Black 70, White B, Black C and White's position suddenly becomes full of defects that Black could easily exploit.

Black 65 and White 66 are virtually interchangeable. Black 65 is now possible because White's hope of a ko after White D, Black E, White F is quashed by Black G. White 66 promises 68 next.

Black 67 is big, but the rest of the game is just straightforward, normal endgame moves.




95 takes ko
Fig. 14 (180-201)

Fig. 14 *Classic Game*

This game was the 26th of the 27 games between Shuwa and Shusaku. The last few games, all played around 1850, are classics, showing to great advantage Shusaku's solid reliability and emphasis on keeping his groups safe, together with Shuwa's amashi strategy. Modern professionals love Shuwa's style and his latent strength surely puts him in the ranks of the Meijins. His son, the Meijin Shuei (the 17th and also the 19th head of the Honinbo family), once said, "I wouldn't feel happy even taking two stones from my father." He was joking but there was more than an element of truth in the remark.

White 86 is sente. If Black ignores it, White 89 really would make a ko, a ko in which White has nothing to lose.

A and B are both worth 4 points and are therefore interchangeable, so there is no hurry to play them.



Black wins & fills $\frac{1}{2}$ -point ko
Fig. 15 (201-227)

Fig. 15 *Shusaku's Attractive Personality*


Shusaku, it seems, loved his teacher, was a model of filial devotion and adored his wife. The goodness of his heart is evident from his collected letters, but they also show that he was not a prude. In fact he rather liked the red light district. In one letter he wrote of his experiences in Gion, the geisha quarter of Kyoto: "When I pay for some geishas they make much of me and I have a thoroughly good time." Apart from being able to make such frank admissions, he was noted for never showing an angry face to his wife. He was a very attractive sort of person.

227 moves. Black wins by 4 points.


Shuwa's Masterpiece

Of the 27 teaching games between Shuwa and Shusaku, the following, the 24th, is regarded as one of Shuwa's masterpieces. It was played in December 1850.

The light sequence from White 6 to 12 in Fig. 1 was typical of Shuwa. It seems that Shusaku overlooked White 62. He fought desperately after that but was unable to recover. This game is a bit too perfect to be interesting, you might find.



Black : Honinbo Shusaku
White : Honinbo Shuwa
Fig. 1 (1-100)



110 takes (18) 155 " "
140 connects (below 110) 150 " "
152 takes ko 100 170 connects (39)

White wins & fills $\frac{1}{2}$ -point ko
Fig. 2 (101-270)

Shusaku never let Shuwa take Black, out of respect for his teacher, who thus had the excuse of taking White if he lost. A later pupil by the name of Murase Shuho — later to become the 18th Honinbo — was not so charitable. He and Shusaku were of completely different personality, although it is true that Shuho was strictly entitled to force Shuwa to take Black in one game out of three, since there was only one dan difference between them. Nevertheless, in the two games that I know of between Shuwa and Shuho in which Shuwa had Black, Black had an easy victory in both cases. You should study these games if you get the chance.

270 moves. White wins by 1 point.

I once heard the following story from a veteran of the go world.

When Shusaku was young there was an occasion when he went missing from his teacher's house for two whole nights. Upon his return Shuwa asked:

"Where've you been?"

"Playing go all night."

"Who with?"

"Ota Yuzo."

"Show me the game."

Seeing the game as Shusaku replayed it on a board, Shuwa remarked, "Well now, that's odd. I thought Yuzo's style was a little different."

At this Shusaku became alarmed.

"... Please, I don't want to be a go player any more."

"What!!"

"To tell the truth I went to Yoshiwara (the brothel area) for a bit of, er, pleasure. The game I showed you is one I made up. I'll never be as good as you if you can see through that."

Continuing in the same shamefaced tone he explained that he wanted to go home. Shuwa was much taken aback. Seeing how his pupil's pleasure of the night before had turned sour, he simply said, "Well, well. Watch out next time and don't get so excited." In fact, Shuwa was not averse to the delights of Yoshiwara himself and the story goes that, a few days later, he whispered to Shusaku, "What was it like the other night, by the way? Do you fancy going again tonight with me, and maybe Showa?"

Game 9: A GENERATION APART

Played on 3rd October 1848 in the house of Doi
Hachitaro

White: Ota Yuzo

Black: Honinbo Shusaku

Ota Yuzo (1807–1856) was born in Edo. His real name was Kawahara Unosuke, which he later changed to Ryo-suke, but eventually he decided to be known as Ota Yuzo. He was a pupil of the Yasui family. In 1848, along with Ito Showa and some others, he was promoted to 7-dan. He was one of the previously mentioned Tempo Best Four.

Yuzo was a good, hard opponent for Shusaku, and in 1853, from January to November, they played 23 games of a famous 30-game match. They started off on level terms, taking Black and White alternately, but by the 17th game Shusaku had won enough games in a row to force Yuzo down to the first handicap of taking Black twice out of every three games. There are 86 games between these two players, including the 23 games just mentioned, and Shusaku won 46, Yuzo won 27, there were 6 draws and 7 were left unfinished. Shusaku reckoned Yuzo was the best of the Tempo Four, but that is probably because he found him unexpectedly difficult to play against. Shuwa would probably have rated Yasui Sanchi as the best. Shuwa won easily against Yuzo but found Sanchi a tough opponent.





Fig. 1 (1-15)

Fig. 1 Irregular Opening

Yuzo was extremely fond of playing *mokuhazushi*. He played it in virtually every game.


Of course Black 7 can be at 8, but by allowing White to play at 8 Black gains the right to take the initiative in the fighting with 9 and 11. White 12 could also be at 15, but Black 13 at A would be too low. There is an alternative for White 14 as well.

Dia. 1 White 1 and 3 go for thickness, and although this gives Black the important point at 4, White has *a* to aim at.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2 As was previously mentioned in the discussion of the game between Retsugen and Senkaku, Black 2 leads to an intolerable position for Black. White 11 and 13 are good moves and White becomes thick on the outside. No matter how you look at it, the "joseki" with White 11 at *a* is just laughable.



Dia. 2 18 connects





Fig. 2 (15-33)


Fig. 2 Black Gets an Easy Game

Black 15 and 17 are very, very thick and overall Black is already ahead. White 16 should have been at 1 in *Dia. 3*. If Black plays 2, White 3 and 5 set up a roundabout attack. If play proceeds up to White 11, the stone at *takamoku* △ becomes very significant. Also, allowing Black 6 is not as bad as allowing Black 15 and 17 in the figure. In view of this alternative White 16 seems rather dubious.


Black is making territory while attacking up to 25, while White is running to no purpose. If Black 25 is at 1 in *Dia. 4* to get ahead of White in the chase, White, after pushing through and cutting with 2 and 4, can capture △ with 6. Black therefore has to crawl at 25. Now Black can jump ahead of White if White simply plays 1 in *Dia. 5*. In that case White would have no idea where to play next; his



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

thickness is completely useless because it has nothing to attack. White 26 is thus appropriate and Black's answer, the clamping move at 27, is a natural but fine tesuji. Playing the hane underneath at 28 instead and allowing White to extend to 27 and then 30 would make Black's position too low. White 28 is natural and then White 30 is another clamping tesuji, this time with the colours reversed. If Black 31 is at 32, White will cut at A and capture some black stones on his next move. Black 33 is the weak point in White's shape.





Fig. 3 (33-53)

Fig. 3 A Cast Iron Wall in the Centre

White 34 is inevitable but it lets Black have the forcing move at 35. Being pressed in from the centre is painful for Yuzo but he has to accept it. White 38 is a kind of sacrifice play so that he can guarantee pushing his nose out at 42. However, Black's thickness up to 41 is perfect and White 38 has just withered and died. Shusaku now has an advantage and one of the things to note about this game is the way he hangs on to this early lead.


If White 42 is at 1 in *Dia. 6* in the hope of something better, Black simply cuts at 2 and White dies. After Black's cut at 8 he has either *a* or *b* for his next move. This obviously cannot be contemplated, but then the exchange of Black 43 for White 44 is pure profit. Black's attack here is going very nicely. Note the skilful order of Black 45 to 49.




Dia. 6

Dia. 7 If Black plays the forcing move at 1 first, and then descends to 3, the fight is still on, but when Black attaches at 5 it seems that White can afford to sacrifice △ and come out at 6. After Black 49 in the game, if White tries to get out at A, he won't want to cause Black to connect at B. White therefore has to secure life locally and White 50 and 52 are skilful moves played with this in mind.

First of all, if Black 53 is at 1 in *Dia. 8*, White 2 leads to Black's ruin.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8





Fig. 4 (53-64)

Fig. 4 A Subtle Way of Living

Next, if Black 53 is at A, after White B there is a connection underneath at C, and finally if Black 53 is at 54, after White B there is White 53.


Incidentally there is a subtle point about Black 55.

Dia. 9 Black might like to resist with 1, but White 2 is a forcing move and when he descends to 4, White has one clear eye and Black *a* has no effect. In the actual game, after Black connects at A, he has an attack at D, which White has to answer by making the placement at E to ensure himself of two eyes. In *Dia. 9* Black makes a loss in respect of *a*, but in return he would get more territory with *b* later. It is very hard to assess the relative merits of the two ways of playing. Of course, if Black resists with 3 in *Dia. 10*, he is powerless against White 10.



White can live by playing 58 at 1 in *Dia. 11*, but this only allows Black 2 and 4; on top of this, after White 5 Black can play at 8 and so the value of White's endgame move at *a* is also reduced.

Black 59 and 61 are purely thickness-building moves. White 62 is then just the right spot. Enclosing the corner with F would obviously invite Black G. In addition, shifting this move just one point to 1 in *Dia. 12* allows Black, after first planting a time bomb in the corner at 2, to make a double wing formation with 4 and 6.







Fig. 5 (64-89)

Fig. 5 Odd Move

After White 64 Black has to take due regard of the situation and play lightly, which he does with 65 and 67. The significant aspect of the situation is that Black is operating inside White's sphere of influence, and Black 1 in *Dia. 13* would be too sluggish. White would leap at the chance to play 2 and 4.

In contrast Black 65 and 67 combine reinforcement with making White heavy, and Black obtains good shape with 69 and 71.


Dia. 14 Black's extension to 1 is a big point, but White can jump to 2 and Black's thickness is not as effective as in the game.



Dia. 13

White 72 next. Now this is a puzzling move. I just can't understand why he didn't push through at 1 in *Dia. 15*. There is nothing odd about that. There is a natural flow, White 5 is a forcing move and White can then expect the extension to 7. Even from the point of view of eye shape and safety *Dia. 15* is preferable. Perhaps Yuzo was intending to seek safety with a clamping move at A after attaching at 76, but to that Black counterattacks with B, so it is not really very good for White.

Following this Black reinforces his own group with 79 and so on. Black 81 is an honest move worth noting. The clever looking Black C is not the right way to play here. After Black 89 it seems inevitable that Black will get the centre; he can answer White D with E.



Dia. 14

Dia. 15




Fig. 6 (89-112)

Fig. 6 Very Close

Black 93 was a cool answer to White's capture with 90 and 92. Black 93 at A instead is virtually meaningless and there is even some danger from White playing 93.

This has meant, however, that White gets to 94 first, which makes the game close, but still Black's moyo in the centre seems more promising.

Black is looking towards the endgame when he settles the position in the lower left corner with 95 and 97, but it is always difficult to know when to play such moves. White's forcing move B after 102 guarantees one eye and either C or D gives him the other.

Once a white stone has been played at 94, it is useless for Black to play towards the outside with E. Accordingly he goes underneath at 99. When White runs away at 100,


Black restrains him with 101 and thus ensures that no confusion will arise. Take good note of Black's order of playing here.

White 104 is big in terms of territory when compared to a play by Black at F and it also helps the weak white group.

Black 105 and 107 look good and with 109 Black secures the centre, but something like Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 16* to erase White's territory seems quite adequate to me (White's counter-attack at *a* is too ambitious).

In fact I would even say that Black 105 and 107 are slack.

Ota Yuzo reached 7-dan. In olden days if you got to 7-dan you received a stipend from the shogunate government and you shaved your head like a priest. One of your jobs then was to appear in the annual ceremonial games in the Shogun's palace. Ever since the Shogun Ieyasu founded the State Go Academy in 1612 this honour had been the highlight of a go player's life. But Yuzo was an exception. He became 7-dan yet never played in the castle games. He didn't fancy looking like a priest and for that reason declined both the official stipend and the honour of playing before the Shogun. Nevertheless, he was allowed the promotion to 7-dan because he was obviously that strong. Yuzo was born in Edo and his vanity was perhaps an expression of the pride typical of the sons of the capital.



Dia. 16





Fig. 7 (112-133)

Fig. 7 The Last Hurdle


Exchanging 12 for 13 before the hane at 14 is the right order for White.

Dia. 17 If he simply plays the hane 1, Black cuts at 2 and then Black 4 is the important point. Black 6 makes a nice profit. Once the exchange of 12 and 13 has taken place, it is more prudent for Black to answer the hane with 15. That is not to say that the cut at 1 in *Dia. 18* is bad, but after Black 5 there is the danger of a fight, possibly involving the ko. The perfect shape of Black 15 was probably more attractive than *Dia. 18* anyway.

At last the expected invasion comes with White 16, but Black 17 and 19 are vicious counterpunches. I think the real reason Shusaku rejected *Dia. 18* must have been the possibility of this nice attack. The point about 17 and 19 is that White has no choice but to connect at 22 and 24. When



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

Black cuts at 25 and 27, White 16 is looking like an abortive invasion. On move 28 White would like to spoil Black's shape by playing the hane at A, but Black's answer at B, although bad shape, threatens nasty things at C. Black C would give Black security while threatening the life of the white group.

So White has to seek complications with 28. If Black can get over this last hurdle without giving anything away, there will be no difficult areas left. White's territory in the upper left is 20 points. In the lower right he again has 20 points. The group extending from the top edge to the right and the group in the lower left together will give a little over 10 points. White's total is therefore just over 50 points.

Black's territory is: top right, a little over 10 points; lower left corner, 6 points. Total, just under 20 points. In other words, Black has to get 40 points in the centre to win.





Fig. 8 (133-155)

Fig. 8 A Possible Pitfall

Black 33 was correct. If this move is at 1 in *Dia. 19*, attempting to capture several white stones, it is ideal for White. White's hane 2 opens up the floodgates and if Black answers White 16 by pushing out at 17, he is helping himself in the centre but he is also giving White more liberties here, and so the black group on the edge will be taken first in the race to capture.

Black 5 in *Dia. 20* can be considered as a variation of *Dia. 19*. Black 7 makes the black group on the right safe, but White can cut at 10 and, although Black 11 and 13 make a sizeable intrusion into White's territory, White 14 devastates the centre. This would turn the tables completely.

In view of what has just been said, Black 33 and 35 are only to be expected. With Black 41 the fight in the centre is



Dia. 19 26 fills

Dia. 20

finished and Black has made over 40 points of territory there. Since I have already said that that was all he needed to win, the result is virtually a foregone conclusion.

Black answers White 42 by completing his connection with 43 to 49 and these moves are also all sente against the white group in the centre. Black 55, however, has no other meaning than size of territory. White's big group has two eyes because there is one eye in sente with A and either B or C gives the other one.




Fig. 9 (155-201)


Fig. 9 *Small Endgame Plays*

Starting the sequence to Black 61 with 56 means that White can play 58 and 60 in sente. This sente is used for the tesuji at 62, and White interposes the sente plays at 64 and 66 before settling the situation at the top with 68 to 74. 75 is Black's privilege. There is no significant difference if this move is at 76: White connects at A, Black 75, White B.

White 78 and 80 are the biggest plays on the board and are worth about 10 points in gote.

White 88 is big, but once Black defends at 89 White's forcing move at C disappears, so White has to live at 90; in other words he gets gote.

Black 91 is a 3-point gyaku yose.



③⑤ fill ko
④ takes ko at ①
Fig. 10 (201-245)

Fig. 10 *Yuzo, the Man about Town*

There doesn't seem to be anything worth commenting on in this figure. In the end Black won by 7 points after carefully nurturing the lead he gained in the opening. There can really be no criticism of the way Black played.

Yuzo was a handsome man, with jet black hair and well-set eyes. He considered himself rather elegant but it appears that that was his own estimation of himself more than anybody else's. He was good looking and he was a strong go player, and as such was one of the Tempo Four, but the top man among these was Yasui Sanchi. 245 moves. Black wins by 7 points.


Superb Splitting Attack

The figure below shows Game 8 of the 23 games in the match between Shusaku and Yuzo. It was played in 1853 and Shusaku had Black.

It is a wonderful example of a well played splitting attack. Black achieves total victory.

The late Tamejiro Suzuki commented that White 18, 20 and 24 were too precipitous and were the cause of White's defeat. There is also a comment by Shuwa: "The way Black led his opponent all round the board was skilful. Black 41 is good, and Black 95 stamps out the possibility of a ko fight."

123 moves. White resigns.



Black: Honinbo Shusaku

White: Ota Yuzo

94 connects at 25

Game 10:

THE WISE OLD BIRD AND THE FLEDGELING

Played on 9th November 1851 and 12th June 1852 in the house of Abe Jinzaburo.

White: Honinbo Shusaku

Black: Ito Showa

Ito Showa (1801–1878) was, together with Ota Yuzo, Yasui Sanchi and Sakaguchi Sentoku, one of the Tempo Best Four. Born in Nagoya, he was at first known as Matsujiro. At the age of 12 he came up to the capital and was apprenticed to Honinbo Genjo. When he reached 5-dan he went back to Nagoya, but later returned to Edo where he received 6-dan from Meijin Jowa. In 1849 he changed his name to Showa and was promoted to 7-dan. In the same year, together with Shusaku, he made his first appearance in the castle games. He played 19 castle games all told, winning 9 and losing 10. He was blessed with a long life and in his late years he advanced to 8-dan.

Showa features in go history as the "Great Steward" of the Honinbo family, the indispensable worker behind the scenes who fostered the family's fortunes both publicly and privately.

He had to study go under adverse conditions and his style shows this in that it is a mixture of first-class talent and methodical plodding, but in his later years he did add a lightness of touch.

At the time of this game Showa was 50 and Shusaku 22, but they had already had long experience of each other and knew all about each other's play. Their first game, in fact, was in Onomichi when Showa was 5-dan and Shusaku had to take nine stones. That was when Shusaku was only eight.





Fig. 1 (1-11)

Fig. 1 Shusaku Style

Up to Black 11 is the same as in the Shuwa-Shusaku game given earlier, but this time it is Showa who is using Shusaku's opening. Actually, Shusaku did not originate this opening. He simply chose to play it systematically and got the retention of the advantage of first move down to a fine art by means of it. It certainly did not achieve the same degree of popularity as the Regulation Fuseki of the early part of that



Dia. 1

century, but it was frequently seen towards the end of the Meiji period (1868-1912).

White 8 is the same as in the Shuwa-Shusaku game and White's intentions are already becoming clear. From the common sense point of view the easy way for White to play is to extend to 1 in *Dia. 1*, reducing the power of the black stone $\triangle$ and denying Black the opportunity of attacking with 9 and 11 in the game.

Black 9 before pinching at 11 seems to have been regarded as virtually a standard forcing move.





Fig. 2 (11-18)

Fig. 2 Different Idea


In the Shuwa-Shusaku game White 12 was at 14, leading into the taisha joseki, but the result was something of a struggle for White. Accordingly White here tried a different move and it seems a little better for him. Of course, White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2* are no good in this case. His position is too low and the stone $\triangle$ is not really doing any work. If $\triangle$ were a black stone, White 1 and 3 would be very effective.

There are alternative ways of answering White 12 but they all resemble Black 13 and 15. Shusaku must have been in two minds about whether to push once more at A instead of playing the knight's move at 16.


Dia. 3 After the exchange of White 1 for Black 2, White can strike at the shoulder of Black's formation with 3. If White simply plays 3 without the 1-2 exchange, he leaves



Dia. 2



Dia. 4



Dia. 3

himself thin and unable to make good shape. Also, White 3 at *a* is not very good. If he wants to make this sort of move, White should simply jump to *b*, as in the game. White's shape after 5 and 7 is extremely insipid but it's effective. The result after 16 is that Black has secured territory on the left, but it seems like a plausible way for White to play.

Black 17 is perhaps too thin. The thick way to play is at 1 in *Dia. 4*. This is a good move. The stone $\triangle$ has no effect here, whereas in the figure White can aim at, for instance, A or B.

By the way, if White on move 16 had gone for territory with C, Black's reply at A would be good.





Fig. 3 (18-32)

Fig. 3 Birth of a Joseki


At the time of this game great advances were being made in the study of opening tactics, that is, joseki. We can see traces of that intensive activity in the sequence from White 18 to 32. It is hard to say whether both players have really made the best moves possible, but we can easily imagine that Black would have disliked switching his 19 to 1 in *Dia. 5*. After White 12, if Black defends against the cut with *a*, there is effectively one move difference in White's favour as compared to the game. If White 12 is at *b*, Black defends at *a* and now White *c* lets Black take sente.

Anyway, Black 21 is a good move. Black 1 in *Dia. 6* is more solid but it is not very nice to see White getting the corner enclosure at 8.


If White 22 is at 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black 2 is a cool move, and




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

if then White 3 and Black 4, we would come back to the sequence of the actual game. It seems, therefore, that White can play either 22 or 28, but it is important for Black to answer at 23 in either case. Black 1 in *Dia. 8* is no good. The result after White 6 is that White has achieved the prized position of having "played on both sides", that is, getting stable groups on both sides of Black's single stable position. The way for Black to avoid this dreadful result is to play as in the game. After White 32 it is Black who has sente, so White cannot play at A.

After Black 23 the rest of the moves follow automatically and what you have seen up to White 32 is the birth of a joseki.





Fig. 4 (32-38)

Fig. 4 Modern Feeling


The modern-looking Black 33 strikes just the right balance. The approach at A would have been too low and would have allowed White to make a perfect pincer at 37. Approaching from a distance at 1 in *Dia. 9* does not stop White from attacking from the back with 2. Of course, if White answers at 4, Black will nullify White's thickness by extending to *a*, but by pinching at 2 White can build an overwhelming moyo up to 16.

A less obvious but quite conceivable move for Black is 1 in *Dia. 10*, attacking White's four stones straightaway. White 2 prevents Black getting too firm a foothold on the side but Black can come out easily at 9.

White's pincer at 34 is a natural response to Black 33. Then Black 1 to White 14 in *Dia. 11* is the normal joseki,




Dia. 9




Dia. 10

but it is not so good for White here because Black can attack White at 15. We can even say, too, that the white moyo on the right is over-concentrated. White would therefore probably choose *Dia. 12*. To forestall this Black chose the diagonal move 35 and this seems like the best move, although there are other possible moves, such as B or C.


Black 37 is a good move. I would have played here myself.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12




47 takes ko
Fig. 5 (38-53)


Fig. 5 With an Eye on the Centre

Letting White answer at 38 and then jumping to 39 clearly shows that Black has designs on the centre. If White 38 is replaced by 1 in *Dia. 13*, the cut at 3 is unreasonable and after Black 8 White is close to collapse. If White 5 is at *a* to capture the black stone, Black *b*, White 6, Black 5 would revert to the actual game, but Black could answer White *a* by coming out at 6. Even so, White 38 was clearly not a good move (yet it was Shusaku's only bad move in this game).

Dia. 14 White's light jump to 1 seems better. If Black tries 2 and 4, White 5 is a forcing move, then after White 7, Black's stones are rather heavy in my opinion. White 38 is bad because it allows Black to play lightly at 39. Black 1 in *Dia. 15*, in place of this 39, only gives White territory and




Dia. 13




Dia. 14

collides with $\triangle$. Black's thickness then looks ridiculous.

Black 49 to 53 is a technique to keep sente. The alternative in *Dia. 16* is tighter but gote. If White 52 is at 53, Black can connect solidly at 52 and White's four stones will be in a bind.



Dia. 15



Dia. 16





Fig. 6 (53-67)

Fig. 6 Clear Plan


Black 53 requires a response by White and this means that Black gets to the lower edge first. I think we can detect in this game a willingness by Showa to gamble and Black 55 is in this spirit. It is just the right move, considering the situation as a whole, and White cannot afford to answer carelessly.

Dia. 17 White 1 and 3 are very clumsy. They just give Black more thickness in the centre with 2 and 4.

Dia. 18 White's diagonal play 1 is good style, but after Black's forcing moves 2 and 4, Black gets the strategic point 6 and the game is as good as over. White 56 and 58 are therefore the best way of settling the situation here. After White 62 and 64 there is a large profit available at A and White can also aim at points such as B and C to exploit Black's thinness.




Dia. 17



Dia. 18

You might wonder why Black 65 is not at D to make a huge moyo, but Black's thickness after 61 is a lot different from what it was in *Dias. 17* and *18*. The invasion at 65 therefore looks like the right idea to me.

White 66 at 1 in *Dia. 19* is good shape, but it allows Black to make things simple with 2. White must seek an opportunity to start a fight here.



Dia. 19




Fig. 7 (67-75)

Fig. 7 The Losing Move?


At first sight Black 67 is the vital point, but this move led Black into confusion. White defends at 68 and suddenly $\triangle$ comes back to life through the prospect of White A. The game now becomes difficult for Black.

Dia. 20 Simply the knight's move at 1 was better. Since Black would answer White *a* with *b*, White would choose to cut through the knight's move with 2, but Black has 5 up his sleeve. If Black scoops out White's territory up to 11, the result is even, which means that Black has retained his advantage from having first move.


The *sake* bottle shape of 67 and 69 has a weak point — White 70. If Black 71 is at 1 in *Dia. 21* to cut the white stone off, the sequence up to Black 15 seems likely to follow. Black defends at 9 because the left side has become thin,

and after White 10, 14 is sente for White. This is because White can aim at *a* otherwise.


Dia. 22 After Black 3 and 5, the exchange of $\triangle$ for $\triangle$ is unsatisfactory for Black. If play proceeds up to 11 it is reasonable, but if White 8 is at 9, and if then Black *a*, White *b*, Black 8, White *c*, $\triangle$ has become a wasted stone.



Dia. 20



Dia. 21



Dia. 22





Fig. 8 (75-88)

Fig. 8 Single-handed Invasion

Black 75 seems unavoidable.

Dia. 23 Black wants to block at 1 but White 2 and 4 are absolute forcing moves, and when White advances out to 10, Black's position overall is too thin.

After White 80 he is promised the connection at 86. Black cannot answer with 81 at 1 in *Dia. 24*, because White's extension to 2 poses a greater problem for Black than Black's interception at 1 does for White. The point is, as Black's six stones run away, the eight black stones in the top right-hand corner will be sealed in and eventually they will die after White *a*, Black *b*, White *c*. This *c* is a good move; White *a*, Black *b*, White *f*, Black *e*, White *c* only leads to ko with Black *g*, White *h*. After White *a*, Black *b*, White *c*, Black's play at *g* fails against White *h*. White is




Dia. 23


aiming at this sequence by sealing Black in with 84 and so Black cannot afford to answer at A. If he does, White will complete the sealing-in operation with 85 and get good shape on the outside. Black 85 creates a lifeline to the centre, but this means allowing White to connect at 86.

Black 87 is natural. Black 1 in *Dia. 25* instead leaves him overstretched and White 2 exposes his defects. Black has to defend at *b* to prevent either White *a* or *b*, but then White can move into the centre and weaken Black there.

White 88 is the long-awaited invasion.



Dia. 24



Dia. 25





Fig. 9 (88-97)

Fig. 9 Comfortable Life

The depth of the invasion at 88 strikes a good balance and it looks ominous for Black. Going in deeper at 96 and it looks ominous for Black. Going in deeper at 96 would be countered by Black A, White B, Black C. White's group would be light but there wouldn't be much breathing space and the group would be in great danger.

Even though Black realises he can't capture the white group in the game, he must still attack as strongly as possible. With that in mind Black 1 in *Dia. 26* instead of Black 89 is too half-hearted. Even when Black attacks at 3 and 5, White 6 makes *a* and *b* interchangeable alternatives, either of which will ensure two eyes. Letting White make a live group inside his territory is obviously out of the question for Black. However, Black 1 does have an advantage over *a* (i.e. 89 in the game) in that it is tighter.



Dia. 26

Dia. 27

With *a*, after White 2 and Black 3, White can counterattack with the contact play at 1. With Black 1 there is no such scope.

Dia. 27 Well then, what about an even tighter defence with Black 5? In answer to White 6 Black can do no better than come out at 7, but this leads to White 16, which brings with it a multitude of problems. Far from being on the attack Black would then be in a completely lost position.

Considering all this Black decided on 89, but White can make good shape with 92 and 94. Even if Black switches his 91 to 94 in the hope of an attack, White will make shape by attaching at 92.

Black 97: Showa was desperate by this time.





Fig. 10 (97-102)

Fig. 10 The Prospects Become Clear

After 97 Black takes the plunge and cuts off White anyway with 99. Otherwise White A would virtually guarantee a connection. However, Black 1 in *Dia. 28* is also possible, stressing territory up to 9 and letting White connect at 2. The game would still be close in this case but presumably Showa didn't expect much joy from this. No doubt his loss in the top part of the board was preying on his mind.

White's hane at 102 clearly ensures that the group can live of its own accord, so that connection is irrelevant, but first White probes for Black's response by cutting at 100. This is very skilful and no doubt Showa was a bit perplexed by it. The point is, if Black plays 1 in *Dia. 29* to snatch away White's base, he can solidify his own territory at the same time, so this must have seemed very attractive. However,



Dia. 28

Dia. 29

once White presses at 4 the rest follows automatically and after White 16 all hope of capturing this group is gone. Not only that, but Black also has to worry about his own safety since cutting points remain at *b* and *c*. White has a forcing move at *a* to help him in this respect.

After long deliberation Black pulled back to 101 and allowed White 102, but I think this has clearly given White the better prospects of victory. Let us therefore consider one more variation for Black 101.






Fig. 11 (101-113)

Fig. 11 Trading Territories

Attacking with Black 1 in *Dia. 30* seems to oblige White, after exchanging 2 and 3, to give way with 4 and 6. The result is that he simply sacrifices the left side and the centre in return for being able to attack at 8. I've no idea how much extra profit White can expect from this attack, but since the territories are fairly evenly balanced I'm sure I would prefer to be in White's shoes. The way I see it is that Black's large territory on the left in this diagram is worth a little under 70 points. White has kept sente and is likely to use it to play at *a*. In the top right-hand corner Black has 4 or 5 points, making a total of just over 70 points. White's territory is about 23 points at the top, 26 points on the right, 10 at the bottom and about 10 in the lower left corner, a total of just under 70 points. Consequently,



Dia. 30



Dia. 31

if White gets about 5 points profit from his attack at 8, he is certain to win.

Considering that the game would be close even if White gives up his group as in *Dia. 30*, Black must have been feeling pretty sick. Once White gets the hane at 2 in the figure his group is out of danger. If Black 3 is at 1 in *Dia. 31*, White makes himself thick with 4 and he then has ample moves to make eye shape, such as *a*, *b* or *c*.

Also, if Black 3 in the figure cuts at 4 instead, White pulls out to 8 and again he will make two eyes with ease.

When Black pulls back at 3 in the game it is important for White to sacrifice the five stones in the centre. An astonishing trading of territories then ensues, but after White 12 the final outcome is certain.




Fig. 12 (113-134)

Fig. 12 *All Over Bar the Shouting*

Black 13 and 15 swell Black's centre territory but he suffered a huge loss in the preceding negotiations and he is still a good 10 points behind.

Black 23 makes a substantial profit and it also promises Black the pleasure of playing at A next. However, this gives White the chance to invade at 28 and Black doesn't get the territory he might have hoped for in the centre.

Ito Showa was very fond of his *sake*. It wasn't that he was a hard drinker, but he did make it a rule to have a drink with every meal. He drank mainly to forget his cares and worries and it didn't take him much to get to that state. He was also very lenient about letting his pupils drink, but one day a pupil came to him and said that he had vowed to give up alcohol for the sake of go. To which Showa is




Fig. 13 (134-154)

said to have replied in front of the other pupils: "Yes, it's not very good to be too fond of *sake*. But a full-blooded young man just has to drink like a fish and eat like a horse. It's all very well vowing not to touch alcohol again but, mark my words, you're not going to be famous."

Sure enough, that pupil never got beyond shodan. Perhaps Showa didn't really say that, but it does give a brief glimpse of the kind of man he was reputed to be.

Black 49 was the point at which Showa really gave up. If Black answers White 54 at A, he can't cope with both White B and C.

154 moves. Black resigns.

The Toughest Game in 19 Straight Wins

Shusaku is especially famous for winning all 19 of his 'castle games'. His record was as follows:

Game 1: 1849	
Black v. Yasui Sanchi	won by 11 points
Game 2: 1849	
Black v. Sakaguchi Sentoku	won by resignation
Game 3: 1850	
Black v. Sakaguchi Sentoku	won by 8 points
Game 4: 1850	
Black v. Ito Showa	won by 3 points
Game 5: 1851	
Black v. Hayashi Hakuei	won by 7 points
Game 6: 1851	
Black v. Yasui Sanchi	won by resignation
Game 7: 1852	
White v. Inoue Matsumoto	won by 2 points
Game 8: 1852	
Black v. Ito Showa	won by 6 points
Game 9: 1853	
Black v. Sakaguchi Sentoku	won by resignation
Game 10: 1853	
White v. Yasui Sanchi	won by 1 point
Game 11: 1854	
White v. Inoue Matsumoto	won by resignation
Game 12: 1856	
White v. Ito Showa	won by resignation
Game 13: 1857	
Black v. Yasui Sanchi	won by resignation
Game 14: 1858	
White v. Sakaguchi Sentoku	won by 3 points
Game 15: 1859	
Black v. Ito Showa	won by 9 points

Game 16: 1859

Black v. Hattori Seitetsu won by 13 points

Game 17: 1860

White v. Hayashi Yubi won by 4 points


Game 18: 1861

White v. Hayashi Hakuei won by 11 points

Game 19: 1861

White v. Hayashi Yubi won by resignation


(Hayashi Hakuei: 12th head of Hayashi family, 7-dan, 1805-1864; Hayashi Yubi: heir of 12th Hayashi, also called Takashio Keiji, 6-dan, 1842-1862; Inoue Matsumoto Inseki: 13th head of Inoue family, 7-dan, 1826-1891; Hattori Seitetsu: ex-pupil of Genan, head of Hattoris, 7-dan, 1819-1860)



76 takes ko at 66
79, 82, 85, 88 take ko
Fig. 1 (1-100)

The fourth game, when he was Black against Ito Showa, is given here. This was Shusaku's toughest castle game.


Black 35 in Fig. 1 was a loose move and White soon got the upper hand. However, ko fights broke out in the centre of the board and Shusaku managed both to live here and to devastate White's lower right-hand corner. Still it was only in the late endgame that he was able to pull ahead. Shusaku displayed in this game a latent strength that was not normally apparent, but we must not forget to add a word in praise of Showa, who really made Shusaku suffer right up to the end.



11 takes ko (right of 8) 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101, 104, 107, 110, 113, 116, 119, 122, 125, 128, 131, 134, 137, 140, 143, 146, 149, 152, 155, 158, 161, 164, 167, 170, 173, 176, 179, 182, 185, 188, 191, 194, 197, 200 take ko. 96 takes 2 stones (left of 49), 97 takes ko (right of 8) 100 takes ko.

Fig. 2 (101-200)

There was another castle game, the tenth, where Shusaku got a completely lost game but again he managed to turn the tables at the very last moment, this time winning by one point against Yasui Sanchi.



29 takes ko (left of 25) 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46 take ko. 49 takes ko (left of 3) 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99, 102, 105, 108, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 126, 129, 132, 135, 138, 141, 144, 147, 150, 153, 156, 159, 162, 165, 168, 171, 174, 177, 180, 183, 186, 189, 192, 195, 198, 201, 204, 207, 210, 213, 216, 219, 222, 225, 228, 231, 234, 237, 240, 243, 246, 249, 252, 255, 258, 261, 264, 267, 270, 273, 276, 279, 282, 285, 288, 291, 294, 297, 300, 303, 306, 309, 312, 315, 318, 321, 324, 327, 330, 333, 336, 339, 342 take ko. 134 takes ko at 90. 137 takes below 6. 139 fills at 6. 140 fills (right of 8) 142 fills at 103.

Fig. 3 (201-342)

342 moves. Black wins by 3 points.

JAPANESE TERMS

aji: potential

amashi: a high-level strategy in which over the board as a whole one permits the opponent to attack one and thus seemingly take the initiative, while planning to catch him unawares when he over-extends himself

kakari: an approach move to a corner stone

mokuhazushi: the 5-3 point

moyo: a territorial framework—potential not actual territory

oi-otoshi: a tesuji sequence for capturing stones in which one makes throw-ins to create a shortage of liberties which prevents the opponent from connecting all his stones

shimari: a corner enclosure

takamoku: the 5-4 point

tesuji: the most skilful move in a local situation

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